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Human Rights and Southern Realities
Tamara Relis*
Human Rights, Southern Voices: Francis Deng, Abdullahi An-Na’im, Yash 
Ghai, Upendra Baxi (William Twining ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009) 
248 pages, ISBN 9780521130264 and Helen M. Stacy, Human Rights for 
the 21st Century: Sovereignty, Civil Society, Culture (Stanford Univ. Press, 
2009) 280 pages, ISBN 9780804760959. 
I. INTRodUCTIoN
The proliferation of international human rights treaties, committees, and 
courts, and the development of human rights norms and standards over the 
last sixty years represent immense achievement. International human rights 
laws and principles are now asserted throughout the world by individuals 
*  Tamara Relis is an Assistant Professor of Law, Touro Law School, New York and a Research 
Fellow at the London School of Economics, Department of Law. LL.B (hons) University of 
London, LL.M (hons) and Ph.D. (law), London School of Economics Department of Law. 
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Columbia Law School, New York and London School of Eco-
nomics (2005–09), Barrister. 
    This essay draws on preliminary analysis of empirical research conducted in eight states of 
India during 2005–2009 subsequent to funding through British Academy Award PDF/2006/64 
and two postdoctoral research fellowship awards at the London School of Economics De-
partment of Law and Columbia University Law School: Economic Social Research Council 
Award PTA-026-27-0979. I would like to thank profusely my eight teams of research assis-
tants throughout India. Their names are unfortunately too many to list, but without them this 
research would not have been possible. I would also like to thank karen knop, Leila Sadat, 
Mark Weisburd, Winston Nagan, Jordan Paust, Aziza Amed, Timothy kaye, Paul Brietzke, 
Fabio Arcila Jr., Rodger Citron and Anna Cheszes for their insightful comments on drafts of 
this essay, and Brian Shupak for his excellent research assistance in New York. Parts of this 
essay were presented at the American Law & Society Annual Meeting, Denver (2009), the 
International Symposium on Victimology, Mito, Japan (2009), the IVR World Congress of 
Philosophy of Law, Beijing (2009), Cornell Law School (2010), and the UNDP (2010).
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of many cultures and traditions. Yet, at the same time human rights ideas 
continue to have difficulty in manifesting their relevance in the daily lives 
of those who are geographically and culturally distant from international 
institutions.1 Thus, the international human rights regime has arguably reached 
a juncture that demands a reoriented view responding to the disparities be-
tween human rights laws and principles on the one hand, and realities on 
the ground for many of the subjects of human rights on the other.2 While 
scholars have noted this discontinuity, particularly for those in the global 
South, few have attempted to realistically respond to this. Two new books—
William Twining’s Human Rights, Southern Voices: Francis Deng, Abdullahi 
An-Na’im, Yash Ghai, Upendra Baxi, (Southern Voices) and Helen Stacy’s 
Human Rights for the 21st Century (21st Century)—address aspects of this 
paradox, and lay the foundations for exciting changes in the international 
human rights regime in the twenty-first century. 
Southern Voices is unique in that it provides important perspectives 
from four renowned non-Western legal scholars—Deng (Sudan), An-Na’im 
(Northern Sudan), Ghai (kenya), and Baxi (India). The authors offer timely 
insight into societies and cultures of the global South in terms of their inter-
ests, concerns, and perspectives on human rights. The authors are realistic 
about the obstacles involved in reconciling the discourse of human rights 
with many of the practices relating to human rights issues around the globe. 
Yet, they provide concrete advice on how to advance towards realizing the 
vision of international human rights. Their insights highlight the cosmopolitan 
reality of the current human rights regime. They also underscore the need 
for greater incorporation of Southern views and traditions into the discourses 
on human rights within any legitimate international order.3
21st Century addresses the main critiques of international human rights, 
specifically cultural pluralism, sovereignty and civil society. The book ad-
ditionally proposes the development of a hybrid regional human rights court 
system, interstitially positioned between international human rights institu-
tions and national courts. Such regional courts, Stacy argues, respond to 
the issue of the universality of human rights, as their unique position allows 
them to integrate international treaty principles with the realities of cultural 
pluralism and diverse local practices. The hybrid regional courts would 
simultaneously promote and improve human rights norms across cultures 
and political and social orders, while honoring social, cultural, and religious 
values and mediating these different values through principles and process.4
  1. Helen M. Stacy, HuMan RigHtS foR tHe 21St centuRy: SoveReignty, civil Society, cultuRe 3–4, 
44, 171 (2009); HuMan RigHtS, SoutHeRn voiceS: fRanciS Deng, abDullaHi an-na’iM, yaSH 
gHai anD upenDRa baxi 163 (William Twining ed., 2009) [hereinafter SoutHeRn voiceS].
  2. Stacy, supra note 1, at 173.
  3. SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 1.
  4. Stacy, supra note 1, at 32, 171.
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This essay provides a critical account of some important remaining gaps 
in the literature on international human rights theory and practice. It argues 
that relatively little scholarship, including both reviewed books in their 
discussions on human rights praxis, grounds its analysis in the discourse 
of the subjects of international human rights law, particularly those people 
actually involved in human rights violations in the developing world. This 
is notwithstanding the fact that a main function of the international human 
rights movement is to give voice and power to those oppressed. Further, the 
meaning of human rights must be grounded in local culture at grassroots 
levels. Top-down textual and theoretical analyses relating to human rights 
practice cannot adequately capture the textured realities and complexity of 
factors involved. Consequently, bottom-up perspectives from local actors 
must be incorporated to additionally inform and possibly reframe macro-
level scholarly conversations on human rights as well as policies aimed at 
improving respect for human rights at grassroots levels. 
Given that the “global South” is extremely diverse, questions such as, 
“What are victims’ and legal actors’ conceptions and expectations of human 
rights? What are their agendas and experiences in processing their cases in 
various justice systems?” and “What factors affect their attitudes and behavior in 
this context?” need to be asked in many locations. 5 Further, actors’ perceptions 
on these issues must be interwoven with information on local social contexts, 
structures, and interactions. Contextualized, interpretive accounts from those 
embroiled in human rights cases are critical to obtain a comprehensive picture 
of the workings of international human rights on the ground and to enable a 
more nuanced understanding of Southern actors’ needs, epistemologies, and 
micro-realities.6 Such micro-realities regularly include webs of family, kin, and 
community. These networks include social norms, exert influence and affect 
actors’ understandings, attitudes, and conduct in relation to human rights 
issues. Yet, international human rights law and scholarship have not been ad-
equately infused with these realities.7 This is notwithstanding the fact that data 
  5. For example, it has been argued and shown in the context of dowry murders in India 
that the issue of women’s rights must be understood from the perspectives of women in 
the global South. See Meghana Shah, Rights Under Fire: The Inadequacy of International 
Human Rights in Combating Dowry Murder in India, 19 conn. J. int’l l. 209, 227 (2003). 
Clearly there are inherent risks in extrapolating without qualification from one location to 
another. Thus, this essay makes no claims as to the representativeness of the present data 
in terms of other individuals and societies in developing nations.
  6. In terms of local actors’ epistemologies, what people know, how their knowledge is 
acquired, and how their knowledge and social situations affect their beliefs and actions 
relating to human rights require further investigation. See, e.g. Andrew k. Woods, A 
Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HaRv. int’l l.J. 51, 51–52, 55–56, 71, 73, 
78–79, 95, 98 (2010).
  7. In advocating a new approach to international human rights to include findings from 
behavioral studies, Woods highlights the fact that the human rights academic and prac-
tice literature has been focused on state behavior. Consequently, what is lacking is an 
empirically-based documented exposition of the ways in which social situations are influ-
enced by and/or give meaning to human rights laws, shape and regulate conduct related 
to human rights and how such situations can be altered. See, e.g., id. at 73–74 (2010). 
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from psychological research indicate that individuals are greatly influenced 
by their social situations, whether they are aware of it or not.8 knowledge at 
this level has the capability to inform and enrich macro-level conversations 
on human rights, but equally to change them. Such knowledge can further 
assist human rights practitioners and architects to enhance policies aimed at 
improving respect for human rights on the ground. 
This essay offers some such data from a forthcoming book grounded 
in interpretive theory and based on new large-scale empirical research 
into the perspectives of legal and lay actors involved in the processing of 
human rights violation cases of violence against women in eight states of 
India. These cases were processed in either lower formal courts or in quasi-
legal non-state justice regimes.9 Actors’ objectives, meanings and practices 
act as a lens to map, theorize and critically analyze some of the debates 
in the human rights literature, including those set out in the two volumes 
reviewed here. The essay shows that notwithstanding state enactments of 
laws in line with international human rights obligations, as well as the dis-
semination of human rights concepts by transnational activists and domestic 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who work to make them meaningful 
within particular societies, victims of violence generally showed little if any 
human rights “emancipation.” This was underscored in their discourse on 
their motivations and agendas in approaching formal courts and quasi-legal 
regimes. Further, despite developments in the higher courts of India, many 
lawyers and judges operating in the lower courts and court-linked media-
  8. See Lee D. Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the 
Attribution Process, in aDvanceS in expeRiMental Social pSycHology: vol.10, 173 (Leonard 
Berkowitz ed., 1977). See also Dan T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence 
Bias, 117 pSycHol. bull. 21, 21–38 (1995), cited in Woods, supra note 7, at 56; cRiStina 
biccHieRi, tHe gRaMMaR of Society: tHe natuRe anD DynaMicS of Social noRMS 3, 80 (2005), 
cited in Woods, supra note 7, at 54, 57. See also Woods, supra note 7, at 58, 70.
  9. taMaRa ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM: tHeoRy, global StanDaRDS, anD SoutHeRn 
actoRS’ pRactice (forthcoming 2012). The book draws on qualitative, partly ethnographic 
empirical fieldwork research during 2005–2009 in eight states of India: Delhi, Mumbai 
and rural Jalna (Maharashtra), rural Saketri (Haryana), Bangalore and rural Bijapur and 
Ramnagaram (karnataka), Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), Jaipur and Jodhpur (Rajasthan), 
Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh) and Guwahati (Assam). With the assistance of over eighty 
local research assistants working in seven languages, the data derive from over 400 
semi-structured interviews and questionnaires from victims (94), accused (46), family 
members (29), lawyers on all sides (86), judges and judge-mediators (30) and non-state 
justice arbitrators (“panches”)(48) in 200 cases. It also includes eighty-three observa-
tions of case hearings in lower criminal and civil courts (magistrates, sessions, district, 
and family courts), court-linked mediations known as “lok adalats” (in lower and high 
courts) and non-state womens’ courts/arbitrations known as “mahila panchayats” and 
“nari adalats.” The mahila panchayats and nari adalats are run under the auspices of 
domestic NGOs “Action India” and “Mahila Samakya” respectively throughout the north 
and south of India. The data additionally include fifty-five contextual interviews with 
public interest lawyers, local legal scholars, human rights commission officials, human 
rights NGOs, and national and state legal services authority judges (who organize the 
lok adalats) in Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, Bangalore, and Hyderabad.
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tions known as lok adalats (i.e. “peoples’ courts” where large numbers of 
gender violence cases are heard) did not feel that international human rights 
principles, including those articulated in CEDAW, were directly relevant to 
their cases. Instead, mainly local traditions were used in case resolution. 
Victims with little education had either never heard of human rights or 
lacked an understanding of their meaning. More educated victims who had 
a general sense of human rights concepts knew little of specifics. Of course, 
in analyzing the permeation of international human rights in various cultural 
contexts unfamiliarity with the term “human rights” need not be important in 
itself. However, interestingly, the discourse of both groups generally indicated 
that fundamental human rights principles such as equality and autonomy 
were of little relevance to their life situations and indeed perceived as such. 
Those more educated viewed human rights to be positive, but primarily of 
use on an inspirational level. Many less educated victims of violence enlisted 
quasi-legal justice systems as a means of obtaining compromise agreements 
with their abusers in order to peacefully return to or remain in their places 
of abuse; these were commonly the joint family homes of their spouses. 
Victims’ desires were colored not only by their economic situations, but also 
by their not wanting to harm the honor of their families of origin. Indeed, 
although this may in some ways be harmful to women, it is well-established 
that the bulk of individuals in most non-Western cultures define themselves 
as members of larger groups or communities, not as autonomous entities.10 
Consequently, concepts such as individual rights can be perceived as alien 
or problematic. Interestingly, victims’ comprehensions of human rights and 
stated motivations for and perceptions of “justice” regularly corresponded 
with those of their family members who also participated in the hearings and 
were interviewed separately. 
On the basis of these and other similar findings from the dataset, this essay 
first argues that human rights understandings, subjectivities, and objectives of 
victims of violence in the Indian landscape—and probably in many traditional 
societies in developing contexts—are bound up intricately within social and 
cultural structures including networks of family, kin, and community. This 
enculturation within particular societies is complicated by factors of poverty, 
illiteracy, and development.11 Indeed, for many in traditional societies the ex-
 10. Claude Ake, The African Context of Human Rights, 34 afR. toDay 5 (1987). See also 
Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate, 9 HuM. RtS. Q. 309 
(1987); Radhika Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the 
Discourse of Rights, in HuMan RigHtS of WoMen: national anD inteRnational peRSpectiveS 39, 
39 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); Eva Brems, Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural 
Relativism As Dissident Voices in Human Rights Discourse, 19 HuM. RtS. Q. 136, 142, 
145 (1997).
 11. Poverty, as defined by the poor, includes not only being materially or resource poor, but 
also dependent, feeling helpless, humiliated by state and non-state actors, and acutely 
vulnerable. Poverty further includes being ill-informed and lacking in social connections, 
thus disempowered. See generally Deepa naRayan et al., voiceS of tHe pooR: can anyone 
HeaR uS? (2000); Deepa naRayan et al., voiceS of tHe pooR: cRying out foR cHange (2000). 
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tended family and immediate community provide social security while stressing 
responsibilities and collective duties for members. They socialize and impart 
values, simultaneously controlling and disciplining their members including 
arbitrating and mediating conflict.12 The associated norms within these social 
conditions perform a regulatory function that constrains individuals’ behavior 
through community enforcement.13 Understanding and taking greater account 
of the dynamics of these overlapping normative, rule-encompassing social 
fields is a necessary prerequisite to theorizing and resolving issues relating to 
the practice of human rights. These social fields range from state or custom-
ary law to socio-legal spaces including community, family, or other groups 
in which individuals are constituted and socialized.14 
Second, the essay additionally argues that on the basis that a culturally 
plural universalism in human rights is an acceptable aim, there is a dire need 
for a new integrated analytical framework. This framework must be grounded 
not only in the perspectives of Southern actors or those oppressed, but must 
simultaneously imbed their epistemologies within the realities of human rights 
case processing in the legally pluralistic global South. This involves not only 
formal courts but also quasi-legal non-state justice systems processing hu-
man rights cases. Understanding local case processing nuances is important 
in analyzing the acceptance and application of international human rights at 
grassroots levels. For example, further findings suggest that lawyers and judges 
processing gender violence cases in the lower courts employed human rights 
principles to a far lesser extent, if at all, than did many quasi-legal arbitrators 
in the women’s courts (mahila panchayats) who had not received any formal 
legal education and often had poor literacy skills.
Indeed, throughout much of the developing world, large numbers of crimi-
nal and civil cases, including those involving human rights violations, are not 
taken to formal justice systems for various reasons. These reasons include lack 
of knowledge of courts, rights or how to formulate claims, illiteracy, problems 
of access including physical distance and lack of resources, and fear or lack 
   In May 2001, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) defined poverty as “a human condition characterized by sustained or chronic 
deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the 
enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political 
and social rights.” Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the 
Twenty-fifth Sessions, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 25th Sess., ¶ 
8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 (2001), cited in MaRgueRite gaRling, int’l council on Hu-
Man RigHtS policy, enHancing acceSS to HuMan RigHtS 1–2, 9 (2004). By subjectivity, I am 
referring to a person’s feelings, beliefs, and desires relating to human rights, shaped by 
the concepts of autonomy, equality and choice.
 12. gaRling, supra note 11, at 51.
 13. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. legal StuD. 661, 662, 677 (1998). 
See also Woods, supra note 7, at 54, 76; biccHieRi, supra note 8, at 3.
 14. See ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9. 
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of trust in the formal justice system.15 The poor and marginalized as well as 
others may also reject official institutions for historical and cultural reasons.16 
Formal courts may seem intimidating, alien, and frightening. Additionally, many 
formal justice systems include structural impediments to the full realization 
of human rights. These impediments consist of uneven resource allocation, 
criminality, patronage and nepotism, ignorance and ineptitude, and various 
biases including those of class, caste, ethnicity, and gender.17
In the context of India it has been argued that issues of social stratification 
coupled with geographic isolation result in the formal legal system frequently 
being accessible only to the middle and upper classes. Even those who are 
aware of legal remedies are usually disinclined to pursue them. There are also 
issues of police corruption and fear of social repercussions, which impede 
access to formal justice systems.18 Thus, although human rights law makes the 
state the main mechanism for social protection, the poor and marginalized 
are often ambivalent toward state institutions, with many viewing the law as 
a vehicle for powerful interests. Consequently, they often choose to place 
their trust in informal and customary processes, which may be perceived as 
accessible, familiar, low-risk, and culturally comfortable. Hence, many cases 
involving human rights are settled through quasi-legal, non-state mechanisms 
of conflict resolution in various forms.19 
The reliance on quasi-legal, non-state mechanisms in human rights cases 
is also insufficiently examined in the international human rights literature, 
including both reviewed books. As Erika Techera notes, “International law 
plays an important part in establishing norms and standards that inform na-
tional law and policy. However, it has failed to effectively address many of 
 15. Call for Research Papers, UNDP Regional Centre Bangkok: Engaging State Institutions 
to Enable Non-State Justice Systems to Provide Access to Justice—the Formal/Infor-
mal Interface (2010), available at http://regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/whatsnew/
documents/20100610-ResearchPaper.pdf. These have been discussed as overlapping and 
mutually reinforcing sources of disempowerment, which may deny rural people access 
to courts. Poverty also prevents people from accessing their rights. See gaRling, supra 
note 11, at 1–2; see also p.n. SankaRan, paRticipatoRy JuStice anD HuMan RigHtS pRotection 
in little DeMocRacieS: a pilot StuDy 10, 30–31 (2003); Shah, supra note 5 at 221, 224–25, 
228; Robert S. Moog, The Politics of Lok Adalats in Varanasi District, 25 laW & Soc’y 
Rev. 545, 549–51, 563–64 (1991); Marc Galanter & Jayanth k. krishnan, “Bread for the 
Poor”: Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HaStingS l.J. 789, 807, 
827, 833 (2004); Veronica Magar, Empowerment Approaches to Gender-Based Violence: 
Women’s Courts in Delhi Slums, 26 WoMen’S StuD. int’l f. 509, 510 (2003); Interview 
with Dr. Neela Mukherjee, UNDP, in New Delhi, India (21 July 2006); Interview with 
Veena Punacha, SNDT, in Pune, India (31 July 2006); A. Chowdhury, Protection of 
Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005: Balancing Gender Equations, 27 DelHi l. Rev. 
98, 98 (2005); karine Bates, Paper Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Law and 
Society Association: Legal Consciousness and Informal Transmission of Legal knowledge 
in India (28 May 2010). 
 16. gaRling, supra note 11, at 2, 7. 
 17. Id. at 13, 54.
 18. Shah, supra note 5 at 221, 224–25, 228.
 19. See sources cited supra note 15.
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the specific needs of legally pluralist nations.”20 Indeed, the nexus between 
international human rights and legal pluralism is in need of far greater 
examination in the legal literature. Although human rights permeation and 
legal pluralism are interrelated, their relationship is complex. Thus, one 
might argue that to be accepted in a pluralistic environment, human rights 
norms might need to be expressed in another idiom.21 
Through normative arguments and concrete cases, the essay demonstrates 
how at the center of the two books lies a new way to innovatively engage 
the controversies in international human rights theory and practice, and that 
these issues must factor directly into any holistic assessments, critical analyses, 
or proposals for the development of the international human rights regime 
in the twenty-first century. Drawing on insights from both books, the essay 
concludes with a call for more research into Southern actors’ human rights 
perspectives, including interpretive accounts of their contextual realities. 
Such knowledge is critical in order to innovatively engage the controversies 
in international human rights theory and practice and to assist human rights 
organizations and advocates to become more valuable to the poor and the 
oppressed. As such, they will be better able to effect realizable change for 
the subjects of human rights in the global South.22
Part II of this essay sets out the main arguments developed in each of the 
books relating to present issues in international human rights. Part III links 
actors’ understandings and objectives as well as both volumes’ arguments 
on human rights practice to theoretical developments in the interdisciplin-
ary literature on international human rights: norm diffusion theory in the 
international relations and sociolegal studies literatures and vernacularization 
theory in the law and anthropology literature. Like both reviewed books, these 
theoretical developments engage the issue of the permeation of human rights 
standards to grassroots levels.23 In so doing, Part III highlights important gaps 
 20. Erika Techera, Strengthening International Law to Address the Needs of Legally Pluralist 
Nations (Macquarie University–Macquarie Law School, Australia, Working Paper No. 
2010–02, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1545528.
 21. Email from karen knop, University of Toronto School of Law (20 Mar. 2011) (on file 
with author). Some interesting works include, Abdullahi An-Na’im, Protecting Human 
Rights in Plural Legal Systems in Africa: A Comparative Overview, in univeRSal HuMan 
RigHtS, local ReMeDieS 39–64 (Abdullahi An-Na’im ed., 1999); Paul Schiff Berman, Global 
Legal Pluralism, 80 S. cal. l. Rev. 1155 (2007); Paul Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 
5 ann. Rev. l. & Soc. Sci. 225 (2009); see also Techera, supra note 20.
 22. The latter need has been noted by the International Council on Human Rights. See 
gaRling, supra note 11, at 3.
 23. See Thomas Risse & kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights 
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in tHe poWeR of HuMan RigHtS: inteRnational 
noRMS anD DoMeStic cHange 1–5, 7–8, 11, 33 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & kathryn 
Sikkink eds., 1999); see also MaRgaRet e. keck & katHRyn Sikkink, activiStS beyonD boRDeRS: 
aDvocacy netWoRkS in inteRnational politicS (1998); kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Prin-
cipled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 int’l oRg. 411 (1993); 
Sally e. MeRRy, HuMan RigHtS anD genDeR violence: tRanSlating inteRnational laW into local 
JuStice 1, 3, 134, 222 (2006) [hereinafter HuMan RigHtS anD genDeR violence]; Sally Engle 
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in the human rights literature and makes the argument for greater inclusion of 
both ordinary Southern voices and typical Southern realities involving legal 
pluralism within the human rights debates.24
Providing data for reflection on some of the arguments proffered in the 
essay, Part IV examines human rights permeation and realities for female 
victims of violence in India who processed their cases in either lower formal 
courts or quasi-legal non-state justice systems. Legal and quasi-legal actors’ 
discourse in these cases is also highlighted. Drawing on these examples, Part 
V sets out both volumes’ proposals for the future, analyzing their important 
contributions, as well as underscoring some of the remaining gaps in the 
theoretical and practical literature on international human rights.
II. PRESENT CoNdITIoNS ANd dISCoNTENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS
Southern Voices and 21st Century update our understanding of international 
human rights law theory and practice. The books engage the central debates 
about the nature and practice of human rights law. Yet, they ground their 
analyses in the important fact that international human rights principles and 
standards are normatively rooted in conceptions of human dignity, which vary 
with cultural perspectives.25 The books additionally offer important insights 
to facilitate greater permeation and grassroots legitimacy of international 
human rights norms and standards. The authors proffer evolutionary expla-
nations on the issues of cultural pluralism and the changing nature of the 
international human rights regime. Their views provide a lens through which 
to understand and address the limits of existing human rights policies and 
mechanisms. These two ambitious volumes are innovative and are among the 
first book-length attempts by the legal community to constructively address 
issues of human rights practice throughout the globe. This part examines the 
main arguments in both books on current discourses and practices related 
to the international human rights system. 
In terms of the present, 21st Century provides accounts of the develop-
ment, obstacles, and main critiques of the international human rights regime.26 
Similar to the authors in Southern Voices, Stacy notes the disparity between 
human rights objectives and grassroots realities. She observes how interna-
tional human rights laws and standards have grown exponentially since the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. They are included 
   Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 aM. 
antHRopologiSt 38, 42, 49 (2006); Sally Engle Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience of 
Law: Implementing Women’s Human Rights to Protection from Violence, 25 HuM. RtS. 
Q. 343, 379 (2003).
 24. See Risse & Sikkink, Introduction, supra note 23, at 1–5, 7–8, 11, 33; MeRRy, HuMan 
RigHtS anD genDeR violence, supra note 23.
 25. See, e.g., SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 37.
 26. Stacy, supra note 1, at 14–21, 28–29, 33–35.
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in many postcolonial constitutions and are asserted globally by governments, 
NGOs, and individuals of numerous cultures, traditions, and socioeconomic 
groups. Human rights are likewise relied upon in the global economy and 
are utilized as indicators of legitimacy for new governments.27 At the same 
time, states frequently do not honor their treaty and other international ob-
ligations by not including human rights in their domestic laws and policies 
or enforcing them in their court systems. Thus, human rights abuses occur 
worldwide. Consequently, the international human rights system is critiqued 
by both local organizations as well as scholars.28 
As part of addressing these inconsistencies and advancing a new legal 
mechanism involving hybrid regional courts to operationalize human rights, 
21st Century analyzes three central critiques of international human rights 
today. These are referred to as the sovereignty, civil society, and multicultur-
alism or cultural pluralism critiques. Stacy responds to each one in depth, 
illustrating that although these critiques highlight material problems with 
the present workings of the international human rights system, each critique 
lacks key information.29 The sovereignty critique on the political right ar-
gues that international human rights are either weak rhetoric in the face of 
national self-interests or are a justification for colonial or imperial ventures 
that threaten the integrity and independence of nation-states.30 In response 
to and in light of the ramifications on sovereignty as a result of globaliza-
tion (particularly economic and electronic), Stacy argues that sovereignty 
in today’s realities of global interdependence should be comprehended as 
relational and humanitarian, and not autonomous.31 The civil society critique 
argues that in our globalized world non-state actors, including civil society, 
NGOs, and corporations are more effective and have overtaken formal legal 
institutions in instituting real human rights change. They do so through bot-
tom up persuasion of governments and international entities. Stacy notes 
that the empirical evidence on this is controversial, and asserts that though 
important these activities have not overtaken law in effecting social change. 
For instance, NGO activities have worked in conjunction with legal institu-
 27. Id. at 4, 26–28. 
 28. Id. at 1–6, 26.
 29. Id. at 4–5, 13, 29–30.
 30. Some argue that international human rights have negative effects or are actually a type 
of global subjugation or neo-imperialism based on European legal and political thought 
and recreating the individualism of Western cultures, which is foreign to others. Mutua 
has argued that “the globalization of human rights fits a historical pattern in which all 
high morality comes from the West as a civilizing agent against lower forms of civiliza-
tion in the rest of the world.” Stacy, supra note 1, at 4 (citing Makau Mutua, Savages, 
Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HaRv. int’l l.J. 201, 210 (2001)).
 31. Stacy, supra note 1, at 13, 30–31, 109–40.
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tions, which are needed to formalize rules.32 The multiculturalist critique on 
the political left that speaks to the universalism versus cultural relativism 
debates argues that endeavors to institutionalize “universal” human rights are 
problematic, imperialist, oppressive, and insensitive to cultural multiplicity. 
Moreover, systems in the global South with divergent cultural norms have 
different human rights priorities.33
In response to these critiques, Stacy argues that an examination of 
normative, practical, and historical realities, coupled with changes in inter-
national relations suggests an institutional response. In our swiftly evolving 
world order we require a more robust human rights design to tackle both 
sovereignty and diverse cultural traditions. In particular, legal institutions and 
methodologies should be adapted to meet current realities.34 As it relates to 
the future, Stacy’s proposal for a new hybrid regional international human 
rights court system is elaborated upon in Part V below. 
Southern Voices contains excerpts from the authors’ various writings and 
offers important non-Western perspectives on the interests, beliefs, concerns, 
and customs of those in the global South. These have been largely absent in 
Western jurisprudence. In providing unique insight on the debates on uni-
versalism versus cultural relativism in human rights theory, all four authors 
discard relativism as a serious challenge. Instead, they strongly advocate a 
type of universalism that is grounded in cultural pluralism.35 Cultural rela-
tivism broadly reflects the idea that individuals’ beliefs and actions must 
be understood in terms of their own cultures. In contrast, cultural pluralists 
argue that there are certain universal human rights standards. However, these 
universal standards must be interpreted in diverse ways by different cultures. 
This practice accords with much recent literature that now dismisses the 
cultural relativism versus universalism debates, urging us to move forward 
as particular strands of cultural relativism oversimplify the complexity and 
fluidity of local cultures and moral norms within particular groups or mask 
power relationships and coercion.36 Thus a multicultural, cross-cultural, or 
 32. Id. at 10, 11 n.14, 29, 31. In line with Stacy, Ghai too notes that the legal structures 
of human rights are increasingly and often exclusively the means to mobilize social 
protests and demands and to critique social relationships and institutions. 
 33. Id. at 8, 12–13, 29–30. For instance, in the “Asian values” debate Singapore’s former 
Prime Minister, Yew, argued that human rights should be understood through Confucian-
ism and that Asian values put social and economic rights ahead of individual rights. Id. 
at 12 n.21.
 34. Id. at 4, 5, 171.
 35. This coincides with Mutua’s categorization of “multiculturalists” in the human rights 
literature. See Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 va. J. int’l l. 589, 
598 (1996).
 36. See, e.g., Conor Gearty, Are Human Rights Truly Universal?, in eSSayS on HuMan RigHtS on 
teRRoRiSM: coMpaRative appRoacHeS to civil libeRtieS in aSia, tHe eu anD noRtH aMeRica ch. 29 
(2008); see also RoSalyn HigginS, pRobleMS anD pRoceSS: inteRnational laW anD HoW We uSe 
it 96 (1994); HenRy J. SteineR, pHilip alSton & Ryan gooDMan, inteRnational HuMan RigHtS in 
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culturally plural conception of human rights is advocated whereby conceptual 
human rights principles are to be supplemented, informed, or contextualized 
by culture or tradition.37 As such, the objective is for all principal cultural 
groups worldwide to contribute in a meaningful way to decisions on the 
normative content of human rights law.38
Deng’s writings provide rare insight into the history and realities of the 
Dinka of Sudan. As a Dinka member, Deng elucidates the Dinka’s world 
views, self-perceptions, values, social norms, notions of respect, and patterns 
of behavior within their cultural framework and institutions—much of which 
are linked to cattle.39 Deng notes that normative human rights principles are 
grounded in the pursuit of human dignity, and that the concept of human 
dignity links Dinka culture with universal human rights.40 
He explains the Dinka conception of human dignity, yet acknowledges 
that there are marked differences between cultures in terms of what com-
prises human dignity. Moreover, there is a need to be sensitive to particular 
cultural contexts, values, and concerns. Thus, “[t]o argue for the principle 
of universality is not to deny the significance of the cultural context for the 
definition.”41 Nevertheless, Deng shows how the Dinka’s traditional values 
are consistent in most respects with international human rights principles.42 
Dinka culture recognizes a strong sense of worth and dignity in every per-
son, with the idea of “respect” for each individual of great significance. This 
   context: laW, politicS, MoRalS 539, 544–45 (3d ed., 2007); Randall Peerenbloom, Beyond 
Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debate About “Values in Asia,” 14 inD. int’l 
& coMp. l. Rev. 1 (2003); John J. Tilley, Cultural Relativism, 22 HuM. RtS. Q. 501, 501–07 
(2000).
 37. See, e.g., Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human 
Rights, in MoRal iMpeRialiSM: a cRitical antHology 39 (Berta Hernandez-Truyol ed., 2002); 
boaventuRa De SouSa SantoS, toWaRDS a neW legal coMMon SenSe: laW, globalization anD 
eMancipation 269, 295–301 (William Twining & Christopher McCruden eds., 2d ed. 
2002). Arguing that both universalism and relativism are philosophically weak concepts, 
Santos calls for cross-cultural dialogues as the central condition for the transformation 
of human rights into a genuinely authentic cosmopolitan language. He further calls for 
a new approach to human rights generally. See also Makau Wa Mutua, The Complex-
ity of Universalism in International Human Rights, in HuMan RigHtS WitH MoDeSty: tHe 
pRobleM of univeRSaliSM 51 (Andras Sajo ed., 2004); Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism 
and Universal Human Rights, 6 HuM. RtS. Q. 400 (1984); Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativ-
izing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of International Human Rights, 
34 vanD. J. tRanSnat’l l. 527, 559–60 (2001).
 38. See SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 1, 6, 36, 45, 64, 110–14, 120–23, 135–36, 186–88. 
See also Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, supra note 35. 
 39. SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 10.
 40. Id. at 6.
 41. Id. at 42.
 42. Deng acknowledges, however, that some aspects of Dinka culture are not reconcilable 
with international human rights. Yet, they are changing. This includes Dinka social hier-
archies based on descent, age, culture, and sex. Id. at 41, 46, 51–52. Deng additionally 
proffers a set of tactics to deal with the treatment and status of women. Id. at 8 n.12. 
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ideal pervades the Dinka social system, which is grounded in the ideas of 
kinship, property, and welfare ties.43 
Dinka moral and social norms are expressed in the fundamental nor-
mative principle known as cieng, “a concept of ideal human relations, 
which fosters deferential treatment, unity and harmony.”44 Cieng provides 
standards for evaluating behavior while the principle of dheeng categorizes 
people in relation to that behavior.45 An example of how ideas and values 
must be comprehended within a particular cultural context is seen with the 
understandings of wealth and poverty. For the Dinka, prosperity and power 
must contribute to moral and social ends or else they do not confer dheeng 
on the holder. These two primary values foster solidarity and correlative 
relationships that reconcile economic distinctions.46 
An-Na’im too speaks to the universality of international human rights 
within a different cultural context: that of Islam, and Shari’a in particular.47 
He advocates a liberal modernist interpretation of Islam so as to reconcile 
and create a positive relationship between Shari’a and international human 
rights.48 An-Na’im, a follower of the late Sudanese Mahmud Mohamed Taha, 
provides a straightforward exposition of Islamic history as well as an Islamic 
vision of universal human rights.49 
An-Na’im maintains that historical Islamic Shari’a law, known to Mus-
lims today and based in part on texts from the Prophet Mohammed’s time in 
the town of Medina, does discriminate on grounds of sex and religion.50 In 
particular, although Shari’a principles have no fundamental problems with 
the majority of human rights norms,51 radical reform is needed due to a 
number of serious inconsistencies with international human rights standards. 
These relate to discrimination against women and non-Muslims, freedom 
of religion, and slavery.52 
An-Na’im argues convincingly that sufficient reform of Shari’a in relation 
to universal human rights can be achieved by understanding Shari’a differ-
ently.53 At present, Shari’a—which is a particular historical interpretation of 
Islam—is based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah. These are the first and second 
sources of Shari’a, respectively. The Sunnah relates to texts “of the second 
 43. Id. at 11–14, 28.
 44. Id. at 42.
 45. Id.
 46. Id. at 18.
 47. Id. at 62–63.
 48. Id. at 62.
 49. Id. at 58. 
 50. Id. at 60–61, 65. 
 51. Id. at 95. 
 52. Id. at 56, 71. 
 53. Abdullahi An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions 
and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HaRv. HuM. RtS. J. 13 (1990).
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stage” discussing the Prophet Mohammed’s explication and application of the 
Qur’an for Muslims in historical times when the Prophet was in the town of 
Medina.54 An-Na’im notes that the Sunnah includes elements of discrimination, 
as noted above. However, he argues that the Sunnah must not be viewed as 
the entirety of Islam but simply a transitional stage of Islamic law that was 
a product of its historical context.55 Islam was first offered in the town of 
Mecca (“the first stage”) where the Prophet spoke of equality and individual 
responsibility between all human beings with no discrimination on the basis 
of race, sex, or social origin.56 That message was rejected in the practical 
conditions of the period. The Prophet then had to migrate to Medina, where 
some aspects of the message were altered in response to the socioeconomic 
and political realties of the time. Although acknowledging that his views are 
appreciated by only a small minority of Muslims today, An-Na’im seeks to 
make the earlier texts of the time when the Prophet was in Mecca—which 
were previously not made legally binding—the basis of modern Islamic law. 
This adaptation would allow for the development of full equality and free-
dom for all, regardless of sex or religion.57 An-Na’im’s general argument also 
includes a call for institutional separation of Islam and the state.58
Drawing on experience from postcolonial constitution-making in India, 
Canada, South Africa, and Fiji, Ghai notes that human rights discourse 
provides a workable framework for negotiating political and constitutional 
settlements among leaders representing diverse group interests in multi-ethnic 
societies. Human rights are also useful as an organizing matrix in mediat-
ing competing ethnic and cultural claims.59 In terms of the permeation and 
perceptions of international human rights on the ground within each state, 
Ghai’s empirical case studies suggest that there are divergences in group or 
individual perceptions and endorsement of human rights. Ghai argues that 
differences in views may be affected by one’s socioeconomic or class posi-
tion as government officials, NGOs, traders, peasants, employers, minorities, 
and majorities all probably view human rights differently.60 If so, the view 
that universalism is advocated only by those from the global North appears 
to be overstated.
As to on-the-ground implementation of human rights policies, Ghai 
argues that globalization has had a negative effect. Global competitiveness 
 54. SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 60.
 55. Id. at 71, 77.
 56. Id. at 59, 63, 77–78. Shari’a was created through jurists’ interpretations primarily of the 
Qur’an and Sunnah during the eighth and ninth centuries A.D.
 57. Id. at 58–63, 71.
 58. Id. at 55.
 59. Id. at 112–13.
 60. Id. at 121–22. Ghai too notes the problematic concept of “culture” as well as the fact 
that the meaning and ideologies of rights have evolved over time, with diverse political 
systems using the concept of rights differently. Id. at 112–15, 120–23.
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and market forces have provided greater power to international institutions 
and transnational corporations as well as their investors and governments 
vis-à-vis other nation states. States—which provide the main foundation 
for human rights—consequently have less funds and power to create and 
implement adequate policies for protecting human rights, particularly social, 
economic, and cultural rights. Further, domestic laws and government poli-
cies are increasingly affected by global influences. In this way, democracy 
has also been weakened.61
Baxi provides rich and insightful critiques primarily related to macro-
level debates and present day realities of contemporary human rights. His 
writings elegantly highlight impediments and risks to the fulfillment of the 
promise of human rights.62 Baxi discusses seven themes: (1) the “modern 
and contemporary” genealogies of human rights and their logic; (2) the 
modes of production and overproduction of human rights principles and 
standards, including various ways of understanding this phenomenon; (3) 
issues of identity and difference, which underscore the ability for universal 
human rights to be repressive; (4) the post-modernist questioning of the re-
counting of global meta-narratives; (5) the resurfacing of universalism versus 
ethical and cultural relativism debates, the latter allowing for much human 
suffering; (6) the risk of human rights movements becoming human rights 
markets; and (7) the development of a trade-related human rights paradigm 
overtaking that of the UDHR as a result of globalization.63 Resonating with 
Ghai, Baxi argues that we must halt the current human rights paradigm 
shift from that of the UDHR focused on human dignity and well-being, to 
one that focuses on global capital and corporate well being, rejecting any 
material redistributive role for the state.64
Baxi notes positive and negative aspects of both sides of the universal-
ism versus cultural relativism debates. He critiques claims that international 
human rights ignore cultural diversity by demonstrating that contemporary 
human rights are dialogically created. This often occurs through negotiation 
between NGOs and governments, whereby culture and religious practices 
are taken into account.65 Baxi also discusses the quality of human rights 
standards and their extended breadth, covering material as well as non-
material needs. However, he highlights difficulties in converting needs into 
rights. Baxi further underscores the hierarchical control over rights produc-
 61. Ghai provides the example of Asia to support the argument that in situations of pov-
erty, many human rights are out of reach as the poor are easily exploited. Moreover, 
efforts to bring corporations in line with human rights standards through self-regulation 
mechanisms have largely failed. Id. at 137, 146, 148–49.
 62. Id. at 160–61.
 63. Id. at 164.
 64. Id. at 175, 197–199.
 65. Id. at 172, 186–88.
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tion within the human rights system. He analyzes the issue of how human 
rights violations are determined. In doing so, he uncloaks traditions (or 
“discursive formations”) themselves as codes masking power and hierarchy 
as the way in which discursive formations occur (e.g., who may speak and 
what forms of discourse are proper) determines what shall count as a viola-
tion of human rights.66 
In relation to the practice of protecting and advancing international 
human rights, Baxi mounts a strong critique. He argues that human rights 
entrepreneurs and technocrats commodify and professionalize human rights 
discourse and human suffering in order to package and sell it according to 
what the markets will allow.67 This requires access to capital, national and 
international support networks, the use of public relations, mass media, etc., 
causing problems of legitimacy and independence for Southern NGOs.68 
Consequently, Baxi argues that human rights movements of all levels (global, 
regional, national, and local) are at risk of becoming human rights markets, 
with associated difficulties for state regulation.69 Moreover, such markets 
would result in losing connection with the needs and experiences of suf-
fering of those who should be both the main authors and beneficiaries of 
human rights: the poor and the oppressed.70 Thus, Baxi critiques much of 
the discourse and many of the current practices relating to human rights. 
Instead, he aims to portray human rights as phenomena embedded in the 
experiences of suffering. This, which Baxi terms “critical human rights real-
ism,” should be used as a resource for the poor and oppressed in their fight 
for a better life.71 Indeed, Baxi argues that the visibility and voices of those 
suffering are of prime importance for international human rights.72 
III. THE NEEd foR MoRE PERSPECTIVES fRoM THE GLoBAL SoUTH
Expanding on Baxi’s last point noted above, this part links some of the argu-
ments on present realities and practices of human rights proffered in both 
reviewed books to norm diffusion theory in the international relations and 
sociolegal literature and to vernacularization theory in the law and anthro-
pology literature. Like both volumes, these theories relate to the permeation 
of international human rights norms to grassroots levels.73 In so doing, this 
part highlights important gaps in the human rights literature and makes the 
 66. Id. at 166.
 67. Id. at 194.
 68. Id. at 192–93.
 69. Id. at 197–98.
 70. Id. at 2, 168, 173.
 71. Id. at 161–62. 
 72. He notes seven methods of how this might be realized. Id. at 195–96.
 73. See Risse & Sikkink, supra note 23; keck & Sikkink, supra note 23; Sikkink, supra note 
23; HuMan RigHtS anD genDeR violence, supra note 23.
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argument for greater inclusion of both ordinary Southern voices and typical 
Southern realities within the human rights debates.
Norm diffusion theory attempts to explain the internalization of interna-
tional human rights principles domestically to state institutions, state actors, 
and ultimately to the polity at large. Through an examination of various case 
studies, Risse and Sikkink proffer a theory on the phases and conditions un-
der which international human rights rules, norms, and principles embodied 
in the UDHR are internalized and applied in domestic practices. This is 
done through a process of “socialization” whereby beliefs about right and 
wrong are ultimately internalized by the polity. The socialization process is 
influenced by networks of national as well as transnational actors, including 
advocacy groups connected to international organizations that galvanize 
domestic NGOs and affect their strategies.74 Risse and Sikkink formulate a 
five-phase causal spiral model relating to the workings of norm diffusion for 
human rights change. The final stage in the spiral model, which they term 
“prescriptive status,” relates to rule-consistent behavior. Risse and Sikkink 
argue that this final stage in the socialization process is possible only when 
national governments are continuously pressured to abide by their commit-
ments by those from both above and below. Human rights principles then 
become norms in terms of collective comprehensions and expectations of 
appropriate conduct, which affect individuals’ behavior. When this transition 
occurs, external pressure is no longer necessary to ensure compliance.75 At 
this point, “international human rights norms will be fully institutionalized 
domestically and norm compliance becomes a habitual practice of actors 
and is enforced by the rule of law.”76 This is when it can be said that inter-
national human rights norms have been internalized.77
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks similarly proffer a sociological theory on 
the effects of human rights treaties. They too focus on mechanisms of state 
change, which involve social pressure. Goodman and Jinks argue that inter-
national human rights treaties result in government compliance with higher 
human rights standards. This compliance occurs due to a social process they 
term “acculturation,” whereby states adjust to their international situation, 
copying characteristics of other states. Individuals are socialized about hu-
man rights, and civil society then pressures governments to observe human 
rights. Although changes do not normally result in instant or major drops 
in human rights violations, formal changes in government organizations do 
have notable effects.78
 74. See Risse & Sikkink, supra note 23, at 2–5.
 75. Id. at 1, 4, 7–8, 11.
 76. Id. at 33. 
 77. See id. at 1–5, 7–8, 11. See also keck & Sikkink, supra note 23; Sikkink, supra note 23.
 78. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, 
Empirical and Normative Challenges, 54 Duke l.J. 983, 983–84, 995 (2005), cited in 
Stacy, supra note 1, at 124–25. See also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influ-
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More recent research on social norms indicates that norms affect behavior 
and can result in compliance without people having to internalize them.79 
However, this essay focuses on the fact that the international norm diffusion 
literature concentrates primarily on the interaction between transnational 
social movement activists and governments. The literature does not exam-
ine the boundaries between global ideas and those of local groups, and in 
particular does not focus on local individuals’ perceptions of international 
human rights norms in developing world contexts.80 
Vernacularization theory in the law and anthropology literature expands 
on norm diffusion theory relating to the permeation of human rights, taking 
it one level down.81 Sally Merry illustrates how transnational activists and 
national elites (e.g., human rights lawyers, social activists, academics, and 
community and NGO leaders) disseminate and translate international human 
rights ideas, legal categories and norms into local terms to deal with particu-
lar issues such as gender violence. These ideas and norms are then situated 
within local contexts, cultures, and values including structures of power and 
meaning. The aim is to make these ideas and norms part of local legal and 
grassroots consciousness.82 Merry argues that this incorporation enables human 
rights to be effective, as this process fosters the gradual emergence of a local 
rights consciousness among grassroots groups.83 However, Merry notes that 
it is unclear whether these translations and the dissemination of international 
human rights ideas actually achieve their emancipatory aims, particularly as 
they relate to increasing human rights subjectivities for victims of violence 
and others.84 Merry’s work is predominantly about how human rights are 
translated into the vernacular. This differs from the focus of the present study. 
Of the other above-discussed theories on the permeation of international hu-
man rights laws and norms none include in their analyses the lived contextual 
realities of individuals who are the subjects of international human rights. 
   ence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 Duke l.J. 621, 626, 
638 (2004), cited in Woods, supra note 7, at 72.
 79. See biccHieRi, supra note 8 at 3; see also Woods, supra note 7, at 54, 75.
 80. This was a critique of Harold Hongju koh relating to Goodman and Jinks’ theory, not-
ing that the authors were yet to explain “internalization on the ground,” in terms of 
real social acceptance of international human rights principles. See Harold H. koh, 
Internalization Through Socialization, 54 Duke l.J. 975, 981–82 (2005).
 81. See MeRRy, HuMan RigHtS anD genDeR violence, supra note 23, at 222.
 82. Merry, Transnational Human Rights, supra note 23, at 38, 42. See also Sally Engle Merry, 
Constructing a Global Law: Violence Against Women and the Human Rights System, 
28 laW & Soc. inQuiRy 941, 973 (2003); MeRRy, HuMan RigHtS anD genDeR violence, supra 
note 23, at 1, 134. 
 83. MeRRy, HuMan RigHtS anD genDeR violence, supra note 23, at 3, 134.
 84. See Merry, Transnational Human Rights, supra note 23, at 38, 42, 49; MeRRy, HuMan 
RigHtS anD genDeR violence, supra note 23, at 1, 3; Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience 
of Law, supra note 23, at 379.
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The authors in both reviewed volumes refer either directly or indirectly 
to the need for greater inclusion of ordinary Southern actors’ perspectives in 
the international human rights debates.85 Deng and Ghai note that specific 
meanings of human rights must be grounded in local culture at grassroots 
levels. Deng further stresses that by seeing human rights concretely manifested 
in a particular context we can fully appreciate their form and content in 
the comparative framework of universality.86 Deng and An-Na’im argue that 
people must believe international human rights principles are sanctioned by 
their own culture and institutions.87 Importantly, Ghai further acknowledges 
the limited value in textual analysis and notes “the notorious distance be-
tween rhetoric and reality especially regarding human rights.”88 
In the same vein, one of Baxi’s central themes in this and other works is 
that the basis of human rights is the experiences and struggles of individuals, 
and that human rights discourse only has value if it “gives voice to human 
suffering, to make it visible and to ameliorate it.”89 As a scholar activist, Baxi 
stresses the importance of not losing touch with the experience of suffering 
and the needs of the poor and oppressed who, notwithstanding their exclu-
sion, should be the main authors of human rights. Likewise, Baxi speaks 
of the gap between human rights discourse and the lived experiences of 
“culturally constituted human-ness,” i.e. it is important to “humanize” hu-
man rights.90 Baxi further argues that individual biographies of the violated 
must feature more prominently in human rights theory.91 This focus would 
serve to respond to questions such as, “Does this endless normativity [of 
human rights] perform any useful function in the ‘real world’? [and] is there 
an effective communication . . . among the norm-senders (the UN system), 
norm-receivers (sovereign states), and the norm-objects (those for whose 
benefits the rights enunciations are said to have been made)?”92 Indeed, Baxi 
stresses that “the ‘local,’ not the ‘global’ remains the crucial locus of struggle 
for the enunciation, implementation, and enjoyment of human rights.”93
 85. Others too have stressed the importance of actors’ perspectives and human rights reali-
ties. For instance, Martha Nussbaum has argued for greater knowledge of the “histories, 
problems and comparative successes” of individuals in relation to human rights.” See 
generally MaRtHa c. nuSSbauM, foR love of countRy 6 (1996).
 86. See SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 42, 215.
 87. See id. at 37.
 88. Id. at 131.
 89. Id. at 164.
 90. Id. at 164–65, 173, 189, 215.
 91. Id. at 185 n.80.
 92. Id. at 176.
 93. Id. at 183–85. In another work, Baxi too notes, “[t]he real birthplaces of human rights 
are far removed from the ornate rooms of diplomatic conferences and are found, rather, 
in actual sites (acts and feats) of resistance and struggle.” Upendra Baxi, Voices of the 
Suffering, Fragmented Universality and the future of Human Rights, in tHe futuRe of 
inteRnational HuMan RigHtS 101, 116 (Burns H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks eds., 1999).
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Similarly, noting the many great accomplishments of the international 
human rights regime, Stacy asks, “why can’t international human rights 
have more influence on the actions of individuals?” She further notes, “If 
there is a disconnect between global human rights values and local human 
rights implementation, what is the cause?”94 Indeed, it has been argued that 
international law relating to the protection of human rights falls apart in the 
domestic scene in various ways.95
Both volumes deal with theoretical aspects of human rights, as well as 
issues of human rights practice. Although all the authors either note the limits 
of textual analysis or mention the need to work from the actual perspectives 
of those within local cultures, none of the authors include in their arguments 
any actual data or voices from subaltern or other individuals or peoples who 
have been involved in human rights cases. Indeed, the human rights litera-
ture is replete with analyses of the macro-realities of international human 
rights. These are undoubtedly indispensable. However, despite some very 
interesting and important work relating to human rights on the ground, there 
is an overall dearth of interpretive accounts of ordinary individuals’ actual 
human rights experiences, practices, and micro-realities in the developing 
world.96 This is notwithstanding Martin Chanock’s warning that
there is typically a wide gap between those who speak for cultures and those 
who live the culture spoken about. While cultures are complex and multi-vocal, 
in the representation of cultures the voices of the elites overwhelm others. As-
sertions about cultures tend to be totalizing and simplifying, privileging some 
voices and patterns of acts and ignoring and marginalizing others.97
 94. Stacy, supra note 1, at 7, 27–28.
 95. American Law & Society Conference at Las Vegas: Human Rights at Mid-Century: Where 
the Global and the Local Meet Roundtable, with Professors Wiliam Forbath (chair), Liz 
Borgwardt, Mark Bradley and kenneth Cmiel (June 2005).
 96. For instance, the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos has been influential in human 
rights discourse in terms of learning from and better comprehending the voices and 
perspectives of those in the global South. His work addresses the main issues of human 
rights from the perspectives of those who are socially, politically, and geographically 
outside of hegemonic power structures. Santos’ idea of “subaltern cosmopolitanism” 
highlights how the oppressed articulate grievances including those relating to human 
rights violations, thereby challenging dominant paradigms about human rights. See San-
toS, toWaRDS a neW legal coMMon SenSe, supra note 37, at 177, 254. Rajagopal’s work on 
resistance of marginalized groups is also noteworthy in this sphere. balakRiSHnan RaJagopal, 
inteRnational laW fRoM beloW: DevelopMent, Social MoveMentS anD tHiRD WoRlD ReSiStance 10, 
104–18, 233 (2003). Similarly, Merry has conducted significant work on human rights 
and gender violence, relating it to the practices of NGOs. See MeRRy, HuMan RigHtS anD 
genDeR violence, supra note 23. 
 97. Martin Chanock, Human Rights and Cultural Branding: Who Speaks and How?, in cultuRal 
tRanSfoRMation anD HuMan RigHtS in afRica 38, 39 (Abdullah An-Na’im ed., 2002), cited in 
faReDa banDa, WoMen, laW anD HuMan RigHtS: an afRican peRSpective 252 (2005). Interestingly, 
the authors in SoutHeRn voiceS are elite, male members of their societies. Moreover, they 
perceive themselves as “cultural hybrids,” and none claim to represent or be typical of 
any particular group or culture. See SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 5, 158, 212–13.
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Global international human rights law is ultimately local to those involved 
in human rights violations; and it is what people believe in and experience 
that matters to them and makes a difference in their individual lives. Thus, 
the discourses of victims, accused, lawyers, and others involved in human 
rights cases in developing nations must act as a lens to contextualize and 
critically engage the controversies in the literature on international human 
rights theory and practice. Accounts from the oppressed or marginalized and 
those involved in their cases can elucidate local human rights perspectives, 
perceptions, and experiences as well as the social contexts that influence 
them. Without clearer knowledge of Southern actors’ human rights con-
ceptions, needs, expectations, and practices, it is arguably impossible to 
adequately deepen our understanding of local conditions affecting human 
rights practice and to appreciate what is genuinely necessary to effectuate 
realizable change. The fact that these voices do not feature more prominently 
within the debates on international human rights represents an important 
gap. Indeed, it has been argued that as things stand presently human rights 
principles remain distant from real experiences, are incapable of adequately 
responding to the realities of pain and suffering across the globe, and thus 
have had limited impact.98 
What do we know of local Southern legal and lay actors’ perspectives on 
human rights standards and on how far rights are respected in local settings 
within the very diverse developing world? What is the extent to which they 
think about and use international human rights law or norms in their practices?99 
Where do they take their cases to? What types of remedies are sought and 
why? What are local actors’ comprehensions, attitudes, expectations, needs, 
aims, and experiences during actual human rights case processing?100 How 
 98. Oche Onazi, Towards a Subaltern Theory of Human Rights, 9 global JuRiSt: aDvanceS 
1 (24 Jan. 2009). Onazi argues that the interactions of individuals with human rights 
can profoundly shape their meaning. Thus, Onazi contemplates a subaltern theory 
of human rights that encompasses the role, knowledge and sources of subaltern hu-
man rights perspectives. He discusses various foundational justifications and sources 
that support the subaltern view of human rights. Yet, he notes that the justification for 
subaltern contributions to human rights may be problematic if they depend solely on 
the degree to which these alternative perspectives are recognized in law. International 
human rights law is state-centered and closed to initiatives that fall outside its scope. 
Thus, subaltern voices are constrained in human rights discourse. To deal with this dif-
ficulty and to support subaltern viewpoints, Onazi argues for a view of human rights 
from the perspective of legal pluralism in that human rights as a system is based on 
different sources of legitimacy. Id. at 1–3, 10–11, 22.
 99. See Merry, Constructing a Global Law, supra note 82, at 973.
100. For instance, North American empirical research reveals materially divergent compre-
hensions and functions ascribed to legal case processing by plaintiffs and defendants on 
the one hand, operating from an extra-legal, therapeutic and communicatory paradigm 
as compared with lawyers of all camps on the other, working from a strategic, tactical 
paradigm. This results in a marked discontinuity of interests, language and agenda of legal 
versus lay actors involved in case processing, with serious results for parties. Acknowledg-
ing global similarities in legal education, socialization and practice, one might compare
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much are international human rights laws or principles utilized in lower courts 
and quasi-legal non-state justice mechanisms where most of these cases are 
heard in the global South? Do local legal and quasi-legal norms reflect things 
that occur at the international level? In fact, relatively little is known about 
how people in diverse cultural and social contexts perceive themselves and 
their cases in terms of human rights.101 
Thus, as part of a broader analysis, this essay argues that top-down tex-
tual and theoretical discourses relating to the implementation, permeation, 
internal validation, or practice of human rights at grassroots levels cannot 
adequately capture and elucidate the textured realities on the ground of those 
involved in human rights cases. Individuals are subject to various non-state 
social orders including those of family, kin, community, and quasi-legal 
non-state regimes potentially wielding much power over their thoughts and 
actions in relation to the human rights situations in which they are involved. 
knowledge at this level has the ability to inform, enhance, and innovatively 
engage macro-level debates on human rights theory and practice, but is 
equally capable of changing them. Such knowledge can further aid human 
rights practitioners and architects in improving respect for human rights on 
the ground.102 Human rights academic and practical scholarship, however, 
has been insufficiently imbued with these micro-realities.
Second, this essay argues that on the basis that a culturally plural 
universalism in human rights is an acceptable aim, there is a dire need for 
a new integrated analytical framework, one that is grounded not only in 
the perspectives of Southern actors, but that simultaneously imbeds their 
epistemologies within the realities of human rights case processing in the 
diverse legally pluralistic global South. This involves not only lower formal 
   these findings with legal and lay comprehensions, expectations and experiences in case 
processing in other jurisdictions including those in the global South. See ReliS, HuMan 
RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9; see also taMaRa ReliS, peRceptionS in litigation anD 
MeDiation: laWyeRS, DefenDantS, plaintiffS anD genDeReD paRtieS (2009 and 2011 paperback 
edition); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About The Money!”: A Theory On Misconceptions Of 
Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 u. pitt. l. Rev. 701 (2007); Tamara Relis, Consequences 
of Power, 12 HaRv. negot. l. Rev. 445, 446 (2007).
101. MeRRy, HuMan RigHtS anD genDeR violence, supra note 23, at 2, 3.
102. See ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9. I am not arguing that violence 
against women alone or in conjunction with women’s unfamiliarity of human rights 
principles is a failure of norm diffusion. Certainly, violation of a norm is not evidence 
that the norm is not recognized. My argument is that the scholarly and academic 
literature on human rights needs to be infused to a far greater degree with ordinary 
actors’ perspectives and realities on the ground throughout the developing world in 
order to more realistically engage issues relating to the permeation and actualization of 
international human rights. Further, it should be noted that by providing a diversity of 
actual actors’ voices involved in numerous cases throughout India, my research averts 
Spivak’s critique of studies’ collectivizing subaltern voices, inadvertently obscuring the 
heterogeneity of the oppressed in the global South and entrenching their inferiority. See 
Gayatri C. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MaRxiSM anD tHe inteRpRetation of cultuRe 
271–313 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grosberg eds., 1988).
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courts where most human rights cases that reach any formal courts are 
heard, but also quasi-legal non-state justice mechanisms where very many 
human rights cases are processed.103 Indeed, it is often argued that the bulk 
of those traditional societies view solving conflicts not through the adver-
sarialism inherent in rights discourses and legalities, but through consensual, 
cooperative methods.104 Thus, human rights advocates have been advised to 
scrutinize closely how the poor and oppressed perceive their situations and 
the non-state justice mechanisms and remedies they regularly seek, which 
frequently provide cheap and accessible services.105
Thick descriptions from legal and lay actors involved in human rights 
cases, whether participating in formal justice or quasi-legal processes, will 
enable greater understanding of the discontinuity that exists between the 
lived realities and subjective experiences of human rights as compared with 
their normative universality.106 Such knowledge will further provide context 
to the normative conflicts involved when individuals are subject to overlap-
ping legal systems or rules. These include international human rights laws, 
domestic laws in conformity, and laws or rules within individuals’ various 
communities.107 This aspect of human rights practice in the shadow of the law 
is also insufficiently examined in the international human rights literature.108 
Although noting the significance of overlapping legal and quasi-legal orders, 
international law scholars have generally focused on the state and not on 
the legal pluralism literature.109 Some argue, however, that legal pluralism is 
gradually being drawn upon as an emerging approach to international law.110
Legal pluralism or hybridity, the co-existence of state and non-state laws 
and legal or quasi-legal normative systems in one geopolitical sphere—par-
ticularly in the postcolonial world—has been well documented by scholars 
on both sides of the Atlantic.111 In the US, Robert Cover at Yale Law School 
103. gaRling, supra note 11, at 51–52. See also ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra 
note 9.
104. See naRayan et al., supra note 16; gaRling, supra note 11. 
105. gaRling, supra note 11, at 71.
106. Id. at 53.
107. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 21, at 1155, 1157.
108. See sources cited supra note 23.
109. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 21, at 1159, 1175; Paul Schiff Berman, A 
Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 yale J. int’l l. 301, 309 (2007).
110. Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, supra note 109, at 302.
111. John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. legal pluRaliSM & unofficial l. 1 (1986); 
Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 laW & Soc’y Rev. 869, 873 (1988); Brian Z. Tamanaha, 
A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J. laW & Soc’y 296 (2000); Franz von 
Benda-Beckmann, Who is Afraid of Legal Pluralism, 47 J. legal pluRaliSM & unofficial 
l. 37 (2002); Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of MisReading: Toward a Post-
modern Conception of Law, 14 J. laW & Soc’y Rev. 279, 297–99 (1987). See also SantoS, 
toWaRDS a neW legal coMMon SenSe, supra note 37, at 92; M.S.Vani & Rohit Asthana, 
Legal Pluralism and Environmental Justice in a Rural Natural Resources Context of South 
Asia, Comm. On Legal Pluralism, 69–70 (31 Aug.– 3 Sept. 2009). 
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notably stated that law and legal norms were something created by norm-
generating communities as opposed to solely by nation states.112
New legal pluralism research and debates now encompass local, trans-
national and international law and legal orders. They additionally examine 
the effects of globalization on legal pluralism in local spheres, particularly 
in relation to the strengthening of non-state norms.113 One segment of that 
literature is more empirical, and focuses on the function of communities or 
local movements in using and regulating norms.114 Yet, few studies utilize 
112. Robert. M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HaRv. l. Rev. 4, 43–46 (1983); Robert Cover, 
The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 cap. u.l. Rev. 179, 181 (1985). See also 
Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, supra note 109, at 302, 307–08.
113. Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ann. Rev. l. & Soc. Sci. 243, 243–45 (2009). For 
background on global legal pluralism, see generally Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: 
Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in global laW WitHout a State (StuDieS in MoDeRn 
laW anD policy) 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1996); Francis Snyder, Governing Economic 
Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European Law, 5 euR. l.J. 334 (1999); Oren 
Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic 
Critique of Transnational Law, 10 inD. J. global legal StuD. 25 (2003); oRen peRez, eco-
logical SenSitivity anD global legal pluRaliSM: RetHinking tHe tRaDe anD enviRonMent conflict 
(inteRnational StuDieS in tHeoRy of pRivate laW) (2004); Martti koskenniemi, Presentation at 
Harvard Law School, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of 
Thought (5 Mar. 2005), transcript available at http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/ko-
skenniemi/ MkPluralism-Harvard-05d%5b1%5d.pdf; Simon Roberts, After Government? 
On Representing Law Without the State, 68 MoD. l. Rev. 1 (2005); Sally E. Merry, Human 
Rights and Global Legal Pluralism: Reciprocity and Disjuncture, in Mobile people, Mobile 
laW: expanDing legal RelationS in a contRacting WoRlD 215–32 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann 
et al. eds., 2005); Sally E. Merry, International Law and Sociolegal Scholarship: Toward 
a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism, 41 StuD. l. pol. & Soc’y 149 (2008); Ralf Michaels, 
The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from 
Global Legal Pluralism, 51 Wayne l. Rev. 1209 (2005); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role 
of Law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization and Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from 
the Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18 leiDen J. int’l l. 345 (2005); Berman, Global 
Legal Pluralism, supra note 21; Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking 
Legal Pluralism, 5 caRDozo l. Rev. 1443 (1992); Marc Hertogh, What is Non-State Law? 
Mapping the Other Hemisphere of the Legal World, in inteRnational goveRnance anD laW: 
State Regulation anD non-State laW 11 (Hanneke van Schooten & Jonathon Verschuuren 
eds., 2008); Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights, supra note 
37, at 92; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to 
Global, 30 SyDney l. Rev. 375, 386–390 (2008); k. von Benda-Beckmann, Transnational 
Dimensions of Legal Pluralism, in begegnung unD konflikt—eine kultuRantHRopologiScHe 
beStanDSaufnaHMe 33 (W. Fiktentscher ed., 2001).
114. For instance, it has been found that local actors may vernacularize international norms 
or simply invoke them for political or tactical benefit. See, e.g., tHe pRactice of HuMan 
RigHtS: tRacking laW betWeen tHe local anD tHe global (Marc Goodale & Sally E. Merry 
eds., 2007); see also Sally E. Merry & Rachel E. Stern, The Female Inheritance Move-
ment in Hong Kong: Theorizing the Local/Global Interface, 46 cuRRent antHRopology 387 
(2005). On how local actors utilize or oppose nonlocal norms, possibly subverting or 
transforming them, see balakRiSHnan RaJagopal, inteRnational laW fRoM beloW: DevelopMent, 
Social MoveMentS, anD tHiRD WoRlD ReSiStance (2003); Rajagopal, Role of Law, supra note 
114; laW anD globalization fRoM beloW: toWaRDS a coSMopolitan legality (Boaventura De 
Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005).
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actors’ perspectives to compare formal justice and quasi-legal regimes in 
terms of their translations and local uses of international human rights laws 
and principles.115 Moreover, there is a dearth of knowledge from the per-
spectives of victims, accused, their families, and lawyers involved in human 
rights cases in the developing world. In particular, there is little information 
in terms of their perceptions of the interactions or overlap between state and 
non-state laws and the systems they treat as law, including international law 
and quasi-legal normative communities.116 Such knowledge would provide 
a nexus to Boaventura De Sousa Santos’ concept of “interlegality” whereby 
individuals may feel subject to different sets of laws or norms which them-
selves have precarious relations with each other.117 
It is argued that pluralism or hybridity offers a more realistic all en-
compassing description of realities at grass roots levels, particularly in the 
global South.118 Formal justice systems may be limited in scope and have 
inadequate resources and reach in developing countries, adversely affect-
ing the possibilities of international human rights laws on the ground.119 
On this basis, in analyzing the permeation, implementation and grassroots 
realities of international human rights laws or principles at present or for 
the future, greater account must be taken of the fact that individuals may 
be regulated by various legal and quasi-legal orders and other non-state 
norms. These may have an effect on their thoughts or behavior in relation to 
human rights issues.120 Thus, further investigation is needed into how local 
actors understand and are affected by these various communities asserting 
potentially competing or conflicting norms. Indeed, it has been posited that 
scholars can obtain a far more nuanced understanding of the international 
115. For some that draw on actors’ perspectives generally. see, e.g., MeRRy, HuMan RigHtS anD 
genDeR violence, supra note 23; tHe pRactice of HuMan RigHtS, supra note 115; Galit A. 
Sarfaty, International Norm Diffusion in the Pimicikamak Cree Nation: A Model of Legal 
Mediation, 48 HaRv. int’l l. J. 441 (2007); DaviD SzabloWSki, tRanSnational laW anD local 
StRuggleS: Mining, coMMunitieS anD tHe WoRlD bank (2007). See, e.g., An-Na’im, supra note 
21 at 39–64.
116. This is sometimes referred to as hybridity. See Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra 
note 21, at 1159, 1161. In the literature on global legal pluralism, hybridity describes 
the situation where laws overlap without completely displacing each other. See Michaels, 
Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 113, at 251.
117. Santos, Law: A Map of MisReading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, supra 
note 112, at 297–99. Santos notes that present life conditions subject us all to “porous 
legality” consisting of multiple networks of different legal orders that intersect. See SantoS, 
toWaRDS a neW legal coMMon SenSe, supra note 37, at 427–38. Santos’s work is sympathetic 
to legal pluralism and human rights. Yet interestingly, the text fails to examine possible 
relationships between these concepts. See Onazi, supra note 98, at 18.
118. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 21, at 1166.
119. Shah, supra note 5, at 221, 224–25, 228–29.
120. Drawing on the legal pluralism literature, Berman notes, “in a world of hybrid legal 
spaces . . . a single act or actor is potentially regulated by multiple legal or quasi-legal 
regimes.” Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 21, at 1155.
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and transnational legal landscape by examining the numerous local set-
tings where the norms of diverse communities operate. Focusing solely on 
top-down frameworks in this context inevitably results in a distortion of the 
wide variety of goings-on at grassroots levels.121 
IV. VoICES fRoM THE GLoBAL SoUTH
In support of the arguments proffered in this essay, this part provides excerpts 
from a forthcoming book based on new large-scale empirical research con-
ducted during 2005–2009 in eight states of India. Grounded in interpretive 
theory, the book draws on primary data from legal and lay actors discussing 
their understandings, perspectives, objectives and experiences in human rights 
violations cases of violence against women. These cases were processed in 
lower formal courts or quasi-legal non-state justice regimes.122 The accounts 
excerpted here from female victims of violence and legal actors involved 
in these cases act as a lens to critically analyze some of the debates in the 
human rights literature, including those set out in the two reviewed volumes. 
In India, domestic enactments of law, specifically the Protection of 
Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 (PWDVA), are in line with 
international human rights obligations. Further, developments relating to 
human rights in the higher courts, and the dissemination of human rights 
concepts such as “equality” and “autonomy” by transnational activists and 
the domestic NGO’s covered in the study were evident. These NGOs, which 
process gender violence cases, vernacularized human rights principles 
and worked to make them meaningful in local contexts. Nevertheless, the 
discourse of victims of violence in two major cities, Delhi and Bangalore, 
on their motivations and objectives in formal courts and quasi-legal justice 
121. Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, supra note 109, at 327, 329.
122. See ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9, for dataset details. METHODOL-
OGY: The research is predominantly qualitative and partly ethnographic, using a multiple 
case study design. Yet, it is multi-dimensional through the triangulation of methods to 
enhance the internal validity of the data, including systematic participant observations as 
well as semi-structured depth interviews and questionnaires. As to the external validity 
of the findings, although impossible to obtain a random probability sample in this type 
of research, the main sample represents natural groups based on social segmentation, 
being victims/plaintiffs, accused/defendants, lawyers on each side, judges and media-
tors, all of whom within each group share a common past experience/purpose/identity, 
i.e. being embroiled in these particular cases from a particular actor position. Thus, in 
researching the few, one can generalize thematic conclusions to others who share these 
common identities. A small amount of quantitative analysis was also conducted, utilizing 
descriptive statistics to assess percentages and proportions of particular responses and 
to evaluate, as far as the data permit, the strength of any associations between certain 
variables such as individuals’ views and perceptions and their genders or actor positions. 
Analysis of actors’ discourse was facilitated by the Atlas.ti qualitative analysis computer 
program, enabling grounded theory.
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mechanisms suggested little, if any, human rights “emancipation.”123 When 
comparing victims’ perceptions of and aims for “justice” in local contexts 
with global visions of universal human rights enshrined in the normative 
language of international human rights laws such as CEDAW and the ICCPR, 
serious discontinuities existed. 
Poorer, lesser educated victims of violence who had undergone quasi-
legal case processing in mahila panchayats (“women’s courts”) under the 
auspices of these local NGOs, stated that they had either never heard of 
human rights or if they had (through hearing of them in the women’s courts), 
lacked a basic understanding of their meaning. This trend was notwithstand-
ing the fact that the mahila panchayat’s paralegals and panches (arbitrators/
mediators) were trained in and employed international human rights prin-
ciples in case processing, visited numerous villages providing inhabitants 
with information on human rights, displayed human rights scenarios on the 
walls of their institutions and distributed human rights information leaflets 
in local languages to parties.124
123. Women’s rights as human rights were articulated in the Vienna Accord 1994 and rein-
forced at the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women 1995. In India, cases involv-
ing violence against women processed in the formal justice system are generally filed 
in the lower courts under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code for “cruelty,” section 
9 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (for restitution of conjugal rights), and/or under the 
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 (‘PWDVA’). The PWDVA regards 
gender violence in the domestic sphere as a human rights issue relating to the right of 
a woman to lead a dignified existence. As such, the PWDVA assists India in fulfilling 
its international commitments under CEDAW, the main UN convention on violence 
against women. Having ratified CEDAW in 1993, India is obliged to incorporate it into 
its domestic legislation. Thus, the PWDVA symbolizes India’s commitment to CEDAW 
and its acceptance of the recognition of women’s rights as human rights. See Chowdhury, 
supra note 15, at 100, 114–15. 
124. The non-state ‘women’s courts’ covered in the study are the mahila panchayats in the 
north of India, in and around Delhi and in the state of Uttar Pradesh, as well as the Nari 
Adalats in Bangalore and rural Bijapur, karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere in the 
south of India. Both conduct near identical arbitration/mediation proceedings weekly or 
regularly for gender violence cases that are similar to those that go through the formal 
court system. These include cases of food deprivation as a form of punishment (known 
as “starvation cases”), physical and mental torture, and rape. The women’s courts are run 
by domestic NGOs Action India and Mahila Samakya, respectively. Both organizations 
receive funding and training from transnational human rights organizations and others 
including the UN, Oxfam, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, USAID, Global Rights, 
and the Dutch government through the Indo-Dutch Program. Consistent with norm diffu-
sion theory, the paralegals and arbitrators in the women’s courts receive regular training 
firmly rooted in international human rights laws and principles by various transnational 
actors, international entities and those from Western countries linked to this funding. 
This knowledge is then translated into their case processing approaches as well as into 
local language informative leaflets for parties and posters on the walls of their courts. 
The mahila panchayats are advertised to the public as an easy to reach and low cost 
(or free), time-saving mechanism by which women can access justice in view of India’s 
formal court systems being notoriously backlogged and corrupt. The mahila panchayats 
focus is generally on poor sectors of society and marginalized populations who live in
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More educated victims who went through the formal court system had a 
general sense of human rights concepts, but knew little of the specifics. More-
over, the discourse of victims in both groups regularly included little or no 
reference to anything resembling a subjectivity that included the fundamental 
human rights principles of equality and autonomy. When questioned, victims 
were frequently of the view that these concepts were of little relevance to 
their life situations and case realities; and though something positive, human 
rights ideas were only of use on an inspirational level.125 This data provides 
some context to the debates on universalism versus cultural relativism, as 
well as those on human rights permeation and practice.126 Some examples 
of the discourse of poor women undergoing quasi-legal arbitrations at vari-
ous mahila panchayats in and around Delhi include:
Sunita: It has been two years to our marriage. He does not work, but makes me 
work a lot. . . . My mother-in-law also harasses me. She beats me up, makes me 
do all the household work. . . . I was supposed to conceive a child but they had 
beaten me so much that the child in my womb died. At night time my husband 
forces me. He forces me every night. There are lots of problems. . . .You would 
not believe that my brother-in-law . . . he too molests me in the night time. 
Do you know about other authorities besides mahila panchayat like courts, 
lok adalat etc?
No, I do not know . . . I am not educated.
Have you heard of human rights or women’s rights?
   slum-like resettlement colonies on city outskirts. Likewise, the nari adalats are mostly 
successful with poorer sectors of society. Interview with Gouri Chowdhury, Action India 
Director, New Delhi (18 July 2006 & 10 Aug. 2006); Interview with Naseem, Action 
India Senior Manager, New Delhi (18 July 2006 & 25 July 2006); Interview with Arti 
Paralegal, New Delhi (19 July 2006); Interview with Dr. Neela Mukerjee, U.N. Dev. 
Programme, New Delhi (21 July 2006); Interview with Veena Poonacha, SNDT, Mumbai 
(31 July 2006); MeRRy, HuMan RigHtS anD genDeR violence, supra note 23, at 46–47, 142, 
156–57; Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism, supra note 23, at 38; 
inteRnational centeR foR ReSeaRcH on WoMen anD tHe centRe foR DevelopMent anD population 
activitieS, DoMeStic violence in inDia volS. 1–5 (1999–2002) at 15, 32–65, 99, available 
at http://www.icrw.org/publications/domestic-violence-india-part-1; Veena Poonacha 
& Divya Pandey, Responses to Domestic Violence: Government and Non-Government 
Action in Karnataka and Gujarat, econoMic anD political Weekly, 12 Feb. 2000, at 566. 
125. See ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9. 
126. These findings correlate with Merry’s empirical work on poor female victims of violence 
in Hawaii. There victims’ self-perceptions as rights-holders whose situations were viola-
tions of human rights were found to be far from universal. Merry argues that women 
perceive themselves as defined by family, kin and work relationships. Thus, approaching 
the courts for help represents an uprooting of the victim from these structures to instead 
taking on a new identity of autonomous self, standing alone vis-à-vis the state—some-
thing difficult to do. See Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience of Law, supra note 23, 
at 345, 352–53.
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What is the big deal about hearing all that? Nothing is actually followed. What 
can those rights be? Women are considered to be a man’s shoes by all family 
members. . . .My husband does nothing besides beating me up. . . .These rights 
are nothing. . . .There are a lot of things heard here. All ladies here do speak 
about them. . . . But my husband does not give these rights. 
Kumar: My Husband, his father and mother . . . They commit cruelty on me. 
They used to bang my head into walls, used to beat me several times. You can 
see scars on my back, scratches on my neck and hands. I was subject to both 
mental and physical torture at my matrimonial home. I think all this happened 
because of my infertility . . . 
What made you decide to get help? 
My father and mother decided to approach the mahila panchayat to seek justice. 
Did you go to a police station to file a complaint? 
No, I have not because I was afraid that my family reputation would be at stake 
and the police will again harass me and my parents . . . 
What were you seeking when you approached the mahila panchayat? 
That I be taken back to my matrimonial home with due regard and respect 
and I shall stay there as a respectable family member. I want to return to my 
matrimonial home because that is my actual home after my marriage. The 
matrimonial home is the actual home of every woman. It is the duty of every 
woman to bind her family with the thread of love and affection. 
I don’t know if it is relevant here—but have you heard or not heard about hu-
man rights? 
No, I have never heard about human rights. 
Just to see if it is relevant here— have you heard or not heard of about human 
rights of women? 
No, never.
Chhoti: My husband drinks . . . What should I do? He beats me black and 
blue. He beats my daughter. . . .I really want things to be settled as it would 
be the best if I remain here with my family . . . Someone told me about this 
panchayat so I came here . . . .They would listen to you and will persuade and 
advise your husband not to drink and will decide a compromise between both 
of you. That is why I came here.
Have you ever heard of “human rights”? . . . that people or individuals have some 
fundamental rights, like, they have the right to live freely, right to education? 
No. 
And what about women’s rights, have you ever heard about them? . . . that 
every woman has a right to complain to the police against her in-laws if they 
harass her for dowry or if they commit assault on her. 
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No, however my parents have given him everything he asked.
What do you want from this mahila panchayat? 
I just want that by any means my husband would accept a compromise devised 
by the panche between me and him. . . . I have no support of anyone besides 
my husband. I just want that my case should get decided peacefully agreeable 
to my husband so that I could also live peacefully.
Victim’s Mother, Kaushalya: My daughter . . . ill fate surrounded her matrimonial 
home. . . . She was beaten there, subjected to cruelty and tyranny and absurd 
allegations. 
Just to see if it is relevant here—have you heard or not heard about human rights? 
No. . . . I have no idea about them. 
Just to see if it is relevant here—have you heard or not heard of about human 
rights of women? 
Never heard of them. 
What happened at the mediation?
I liked it. . . . They asked us to explain the whole case. . . . Then the panches 
[mediators/arbitrators] asked the in-laws to defend and they explained their 
side. After listening to all, the panches decided the matter and brought before 
a settlement pact which was agreed to by both the parties . . . At the end of 
the mediation process, her in-laws apologized and realized their mistakes. My 
daughter accepted the verdict to return to her matrimonial home. The mahila 
panchayat has asked my in-laws to treat her with dignity and respect without 
any ill treatment. They imposed on her in-laws a fine . . . I am satisfied. 
If you could change anything about the process, to better deal with disputants’ 
needs, what would you change? 
Such matters should not be made public so that the reputation of the family can 
be maintained. Otherwise, we have to face heavy humiliation.127
Many victims of violence, particularly those in lower socioeconomic and 
educational groups, enlisted quasi-legal justice systems as a means of ob-
taining compromise agreements with their abusers in order to peacefully 
return to or remain in their places of abuse. These were commonly the joint 
family homes of their spouses. Victims’ desires for “justice” were colored 
by their not wanting to harm the honor of their families of origin, as well 
as economic issues including dowry paid by their families to the families of 
their spouses. Women in the developing world are frequently poor, illiterate 
and dominated by parents or spouses.128 Thus, it was not entirely surprising 
127. See ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9.
128. Shah, supra note 5, at 227.
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that victims’ understandings of human rights and stated motivations for and 
perceptions of justice relating to the court or non-state justice hearings they 
underwent regularly corresponded with those of their family members, who 
partook in their hearings and were interviewed separately. In fact, the data 
further suggest that female victims of violence were frequently subservient 
not only to the families of their spouses, but also to the desires of their 
families of origin in terms of whether at all to approach any justice system, 
and if so, which one and what to seek there.129 
This essay therefore argues that human rights comprehensions and 
subjectivities as well as the desires and perceptions of “justice” of female 
victims of violence in the Indian landscape, and probably in many traditional 
societies of the global South, are bound up intricately within local social and 
cultural structures including networks of family, kin and community.130 This 
is further complicated by issues of poverty, illiteracy, and development. For 
instance, there were differences found between victims of different socio-
economic groups. Those in better financial and educational situations were 
less willing to accept perceived inequities, whereas those in lesser educated 
and lower socioeconomic groups regularly repeated that notwithstanding any 
violence, their husbands “were their gods.”131 Consequently, disempower-
ment appeared to be internalized on various levels.132
Female victims of violence who were more educated (college and above) 
generally appeared relatively more independent in their decisions of whether 
or not to approach a justice system, which justice system to engage, and 
what to seek there. They were also more broadly aware of international 
human rights concepts and the fact that they also pertained to women. 
However, they too were unaware of specifics. Moreover, these women were 
largely of the view that human rights ideas were predominantly of use or 
relevant on an inspirational and not a practical level in terms of their own 
case realities and life situations. For example, the following two interview 
excerpts are from women with higher education who processed their cases 
in the Bangalore courts of south India. 
Kumar: There was physical ill-treatment and there were times when it was too 
severe and . . . I was admitted to the hospital. . . . It was something that happened 
almost every day. . . . It was my husband but . . . in the midst of the abuse, his 
mother, who is a widow, also joined him and both of them basically beat me up.
129. Interestingly, Ghai posits that the empowerment that consciousness of rights has brought 
to women, peasants, workers, disabled, is amongst the strongest threats to discriminatory 
and oppressive cultural beliefs and practices, although the traditional forms of deference 
and obedience still have a powerful hold in many places. SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, 
at 137.
130. On enculturation within particular societies, see Brems, supra note 10, at 156.
131. See ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9.
132. This resonates with Ghai’s argument that individuals’ perceptions of rights are affected 
by their socioeconomic position in society. See SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 113.
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Did you go to a police station to file a complaint? 
Yes . . . the 498A proceedings . . . are still ongoing . . . 
What help did you want? 
I was seeking a quick resolution to this case in terms of judicial separation 
from my husband.
Were you seeking punishment? 
Punishment? No. I don’t think there is a point.
Compensation? 
I don’t want that. I feel I am independent enough. 
Have you heard about human rights? 
I have to a very limited extent, yes. 
Where and how exactly did you come to hear about them? 
Magazines and I suppose whatever knowledge I had through school. 
How do you understand what they are about?
About equality basically, in its way outmoded and I suppose a very naive con-
cept. I suppose that is what human rights is about. 
Do you think any of these human rights affect you or your dispute at all? 
Human rights in general, I don’t think so. I think they are very culturally specific 
sort of concept and so, yeah every culture has what is called its human rights . . . 
Have you heard about human rights of women? 
Yeah, very general again . . . through magazines and recent news reports . . . 
when caught in a patriarchal set up it is the women’s rights that have been 
taken away, and we were made to believe that they don’t have any rights. So, 
it is an eye-opener. 
devika: I was subjected to ill treatment of my husband and in-laws also. . . . 
They used to harass me for dowry . . . and . . . a bracelet. . . . I was subject 
to physical ill treatment by husband and sister in law . . . and of course baby 
aggravated the situation more . . . because they always were expecting a boy 
child. . . . When I spoke to my parents, they were very supportive . . . and ac-
cepted my idea of going to the court. 
Did you go to a police station to file a complaint? 
Yes. . . . But . . . there was not much investigation. 
Was an FIR [First Information Report] filed? 
Yes . . . and s.498A proceedings . . . Hindu Marriage Act . . . and some Violence 
Against Women Act. 
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Just to see whether they are relevant or not, have you heard or not heard of 
human rights? 
Yes . . . through TV, newspaper, and articles. . . . It keeps on coming up every 
other day how the rights are violated. 
How did you understand what they actually are? 
Depending upon the circumstances it changes from person to person. . . . I 
think human rights should be brought out in my case too. My individual feelings 
were never respected in my in-laws house. That is also a part of human rights. 
What do you think about the workings of the human rights of women in these 
cases? 
No idea. But the way they are bringing them out is good. People get enlight-
ened about it.133
In addition to victims’ discourses, preliminary analysis of primary data from 
non-state justice arbitrators/mediators as well as legal actors working in the 
lower criminal and civil courts suggested that on another, perhaps unexpected 
level, there were further issues complicating the acceptance and application 
of international human rights principles on the ground within the formal 
justice system. The bulk of lawyer advocates and judges processing violence 
against women cases in the court-linked lok adalat mediations appeared to 
be employing international human rights principles to a far lesser extent, if 
at all than did the quasi-legal mediators/arbitrators (panches) in the mahila 
panchayats who had not received formal legal education. Many lower court 
judges and lawyer advocates did not feel that CEDAW or, in fact, interna-
tional human rights principles at all were directly relevant to their cases 
involving gender violence. Thus neither the language nor the principles of 
international human rights were utilized in case processing. For example: 
delhi Lok Adalat Court Lawyer-Mediator: I know human rights are part of the 
LL.B . . . I’ve never heard of CEDAW. It’s not relevant here. It’s not used. It’s 
mostly the tradition used. 
Jalna, Maharashtra Lok Adalat Court Lawyer-Mediator: We use common sense 
and tradition to resolve cases . . . not formal law or human rights or international 
laws. It’s not necessary.
Hyderabad Judge & Lok Adalat Court Lawyer-Mediator: Are human rights 
relevant here? 
Not directly.
133. See ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9. 
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Mumbai Lok Adalat Court Lawyer-Mediator: The most important thing here is 
the local tradition and status of the family in society. You apply those standards 
in the case.134
In contrast and somewhat paradoxically, the non-lawyer arbitrators/mediators 
in the quasi-legal justice systems studied around Delhi,—many of whom had 
poor literacy skills—generally appeared far more geared towards resolving 
cases utilizing principles of international human rights law, and CEDAW 
in particular, as opposed to simply following local tradition or custom.135 
For example, the following are interview excerpts from panches (non-state 
quasi-legal arbitrators/mediators):
Women’s rights are human rights—the right to live with dignity and free from 
violence
We are trained in human rights laws and CEDAW. . . . We go twice a month.
We use these [human rights] principles in reaching resolutions to these cases.136
This dichotomy may be a result of various factors. First, there is no manda-
tory continuing legal education in India for lawyers. Thus, those advocates 
who began practice prior to India’s ratification of CEDAW in 1993 or other 
international legal documents might be less aware of various international 
laws possibly affecting their cases. Second, the quasi-legal justice mediations 
and arbitrations covered in the research took place under the auspices of 
various local NGOs. Consistent with norm diffusion and vernacularization 
theories, these NGOs received funding and consequently regular training 
in international human rights laws and principles by various international 
NGOs and transnational actors and entities from Western countries, such 
as USAID and the Dutch government through their Indo-Dutch program.137 
However, evidence throughout the dataset also indicated that additional 
factors involving the social contexts and situations within which legal and 
quasi-legal actors lived additionally impacted their attitudes and conduct. 
Indeed, this data further lends support to arguments that grassroots com-
pliance with legal, international, and other norms often evinces sociopoliti-
cal actualities to a far greater extent than the legal status of those norms. 
Social contexts at grassroots levels, whether among legal or lay individuals, 
134. Id. 
135. Interestingly, in articulating their mission, Action India—who run the mahila pan-
chayats—state “We believe that women’s rights are human rights.” Interview with Gouri 
Chowdhury, Action India Director, New Delhi (18 July 2006; 10 Aug. 2006). See http://
actionindiaworld.org/pages/about-us/mission.php.
136. See ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9.
137. See Tamara Relis, Human Rights & Violence Against Women in India: Paradoxes in 
Formal Courts vs. Informal Justice Mechanisms, Presentation at the American Law & 
Society Conference in Berlin, (July 2007) and the Annual Conference on South Asia, 
Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison (Oct. 2007).
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frequently entail systems of control and have normative influence.138 State 
enforcement of human rights-related laws may have little local normative 
purchase.139 Thus, legal rules that are incompatible with community norms or 
local customs may have little effect on the ground unless they are imposed 
by force.140 Consequently, the incorporation of human rights into domestic 
legislation, often held up by governments as a measure of their respect for 
human rights, does not by itself ensure access to those rights. 
The data on legal actors may also explain the lack of expressed human 
rights subjectivities found in victims of violence in the dataset who pro-
cessed their cases through the formal courts. Merry argues that human rights 
identities are difficult for individuals to take on without institutions taking 
these rights seriously when they are claimed by individuals. The adoption 
of rights’ subjectivity and talk depends on experiences within individuals’ 
social contexts and with the legal system. These experiences include those 
with police, attorneys, prosecutors, judges, etc., that may or may not rein-
force this subjectivity and identity. Thus, it is insufficient simply to educate 
people about the availability of rights. Practices within legal systems must be 
put into place to reinforce the experience of these rights, as implementation 
is fundamental to establishing human rights consciousness.141 Yet, material 
numbers of states lack either the resources or the political desire to run ef-
fective administrations. Without effective enforcement, the law means little 
to ordinary people and many do not benefit from their rights.142 
In offering thickly contextual perspectives of law, needs and rights bound 
up within social and cultural structures, the excerpts provided here offer a 
modest example of some of the micro-realities affecting international human 
rights practice on the ground in a developing world context. The data further 
underscore the importance of understanding the dynamics of overlapping 
normative social fields in which individuals are constituted and socialized. 
These social fields consist of rules as well as various means of inducing 
compliance. They range from state or customary law to sociolegal spaces 
including community, family or other groups. In depth knowledge of these 
social fields furthers our understanding of individuals’ attitudes and conduct 
in relation to international human rights laws.143 
Comprehension of local actors’ perspectives on human rights principles 
and norms, and what influences them, provides the substance necessary to 
138. Woods, supra note 7, at 107, 111.
139. Id. at 98.
140. Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 111, at 889; Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, supra 
note 21, at 232.
141. See Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience of Law, supra note 23, at 344–45, 346–47, 
368, 381.
142. gaRling, supra note 11, at 1, 7–8.
143. Woods, supra note 7, at 74.
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theorize and resolve issues relating to the practice of human rights. In this 
way, the data serve to highlight the urgent need to incorporate such research 
into contemporary human rights debates in order to better comprehend 
Southern actors’ diverse epistemologies as well as the complexity of fac-
tors affecting the micro-realities of human rights practice in the developing 
world. Such knowledge would provide broader scope for understanding 
why, notwithstanding the many successes of the international human rights 
regime, human rights still have difficulty in being perceived as relevant in 
the daily lives of many.
V. fUTURE PRoPoSALS foR INTERNATIoNAL HUMAN RIGHTS
In terms of the future, both reviewed books include important recommenda-
tions for reform to match many of the new realities and challenges to the 
international human rights regime in the twenty-first century. Together, these 
modernized sets of perspectives and programs form a progressive agenda for 
justice and an important contribution to the developing field of international 
human rights law. This part sets out the proposals for the future put forward 
in Southern Voices and 21st Century together with comments drawing in 
part on the arguments developed in Parts III and IV above.
On a macro level, Baxi stresses the lengthy process by which only some 
human rights norms become operational. Thus, he seeks to achieve an opti-
mal production of internationally enforceable human rights.144 As discussed 
in Part II above, Baxi additionally argues for the need to develop a plan of 
action to arrest the paradigm-shift whereby human rights movements of all 
levels—global, regional, national, and local—are at risk of becoming hu-
man rights markets, with such markets losing connection with the needs 
and experiences of those suffering human rights abuses.145 Baxi does not 
elaborate in Southern Voices on the mechanisms by which these suggestions 
would be operationalized. Yet, their importance merits further consideration.
In terms of the actualization of human rights on the ground, both 
An-Na’im and Deng speak of the essential need to strengthen the cultural 
legitimacy and effectiveness of international human rights standards at grass-
roots levels.146 In his thesis on cultural legitimation, An-Na’im argues that 
people are more likely to honor and abide by normative propositions such 
as international human rights standards if they believe they are endorsed 
by their own cultural traditions.147 Thus, human rights will be viewed as 
144. SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 176–77.
145. Id. at 197, 204–05, 207–08.
146. Id. at 63.
147. In the case of Islam, An-Na’im proposes reforms of Shari’a to make it consistent with 
universal human rights, but these reforms also require that Shari’a maintain its Islamic
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legitimate on the ground mainly by dialogue, debates, and struggle internal 
to particular cultures about the meaning and implications of basic human 
values and norms.148 Implicit in this argument is the fact that those within 
particular cultures who interpret and advance universal norms must be 
sensitive to the integrity and internal logic of local traditions and must rely 
on local norms and institutions. This sensitivity is necessary for meaningful 
and enduring changes in attitudes and practices.149 Within this paradigm, 
An-Na’im acknowledges the necessity of taking account of class, power and 
gender issues when deciding who is to be involved in the dialogues at both 
local and international levels, as all groups must be heard.150 Subsequent to 
this internal stage, human rights scholars and advocates should then seek 
cross-cultural legitimacy through dialogue so that peoples of diverse cultural 
models can agree on the meaning, scope, and methods of implementing 
these rights.151
Deng too stresses that for international human rights permeation, 
grassroots legitimacy, internalization and meaningful, effective, and lasting 
changes in attitudes and practices of those in the global South, people must 
be confident that human rights are sanctioned by their own cultural norms and 
institutions.152 This will involve education, cross-cultural communication, and 
practical cooperation.153 Similarly, Ghai notes that for human rights principles 
to be perceived as legitimate by people within various cultures, validation 
will need to derive from within each culture or tradition by reinterpreting 
texts.154 Adding to this, Ghai argues that while litigation is important, the 
better means of human rights grassroots change is social mobilization via 
international and local NGOs mobilizing rights.155
The findings touched on in Part IV above highlight two phenomena 
related to these proposals. First, international human rights norms were 
shown to be adopted and disseminated by non-state quasi-legal respected 
community arbitrators/mediators processing gender violence cases. The 
dissemination was done through various human rights information camps 
   legitimacy if it is to be effective in changing Muslim attitudes and policies on these is-
sues. Id. at 63, 69–71, 75–77. An-Na’im, in another work similarly argues that human 
rights advocates in the Muslim world must work within the framework of Islam to be 
effective. An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World, supra note 53, at 13.
148. SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 80.
149. Id. at 37–38.
150. See abDullaHi an-na’iM, cultuRal tRanSfoRMation anD HuMan RigHtS in afRica 54 (Abdullahi 
An-Na’im ed., 2002), cited in banDa, supra note 97, at 260.
151. SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 55, 81, 89, 91.
152. Id. at 37. In support of this, Deng notes the failure of African constitutions created by 
former colonizers, replete with foreign principles of liberal democracy thus lacking in 
domestic legitimacy. Id. at 33–35.
153. Id. at 38, 44, 51.
154. Id. at 110–13.
155. Id. at 149.
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whereby NGOs provided human rights information to thousands of villagers, 
through diagrams on their institution walls and via information leaflets in 
local languages distributed to parties and others who attended their hear-
ings. Nevertheless, little if any human rights subjectivity was indicated in the 
discourse of victims undergoing quasi-legal case processing.156 The situation 
was not wholly dissimilar with more educated victims who used the formal 
courts and who had heard of human rights, particularly through the media 
(indicating domestic validation of international human rights principles). 
Second, notwithstanding relevant human rights domestic legislation for 
these cases (the PWDVA) and the progressive human rights stance of India’s 
Supreme Court, legal actors processing violence against women cases in the 
lower courts indicated little if any use of human rights principles or language 
when engaged in these cases.157 
These findings suggest that proposals for broader human rights accep-
tance, internalization, and practice in developing nations require deeper 
understanding and inclusion of local legal and lay actors’ perceptions on 
their social and professional realities relating to human rights. As argued 
throughout this essay, greater account needs to be taken of the dynamics of 
overlapping normative, rule-encompassing social fields in which both legal 
and lay actors are embedded. These normative social fields include state 
law, customary law, and sociolegal spaces encompassing family, kin, and 
community in which individuals are constituted and socialized. Inclusion of 
local actors’ perceptions of their social and professional realities is needed 
because these social fields influence people’s attitudes and conduct in re-
lation to human rights. Consequently, this knowledge is valuable in terms 
of theorizing and resolving issues relating to the practice of human rights, 
particularly in non-Western contexts.
In addressing the realities of cultural pluralism and offering a technique 
to precipitate internal cultural discourse, 21st Century sets out a concrete 
plan of action. Aiming for the internal legitimacy of international human 
rights ideas, treaty standards and institutions in the eyes of those living in 
different cultures, religions, and political infrastructures globally, 21st Century 
proposes the development of a hybrid regional international human rights 
court system to be situated between national courts and international hu-
man rights institutions.158 
These regional human rights civil courts would be used to promote 
and ameliorate human rights standards and implementation across cultures 
and systems by articulating norms of conduct and their justification, and 
defining how they should be applied in light of local practices. At the same 
156. See ReliS, HuMan RigHtS anD legal pluRaliSM, supra note 9.
157. See Onazi, supra note 98.
158. Stacy, supra note 1, at 4–5, 171.
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time, the courts would honor local social, cultural and religious values 
embedded in claims of cultural exceptionalism.159 To support this proposi-
tion, Stacy proffers a modified, two-pronged “margin of appreciation” as an 
adjudicative method for courts to balance general human rights principles 
with local norms.160 The “margin of appreciation” is an interpretive device 
utilized by the ECHR that allows for local variations of universal human 
rights norms.161 Stacy’s modified technique would additionally enable the 
courts to incorporate evidence from NGOs, international trade accords, and 
human rights agreements as evidence of new human rights benchmarks.162 
Stacy argues that these courts will be able to precipitate social change 
as court remedies will be directed at governments and will influence both 
governments and individuals through putting credible anthropological, ethno-
graphic, and other evidence into the public domain (showing, for example, 
existing differences within cultures).163 This regional court system would 
be less vulnerable to pressures from the state than national human rights 
commissions, and would additionally allow for principled regional human 
rights variations through legal concepts. This result would be of particular 
significance for claims of cultural exceptionalism.164
Stacy’s proposals are exciting. Regional human rights systems have been 
argued to be the most efficient modes of advancement of human rights 
globally.165 Some further posit that a hybrid court system would allow for a 
more diverse range of actors than those at international levels.166 Of course, 
due to the reality of multiple communities with differing norms, there will 
always be resistance to the imposition of universal principles. Thus, although 
a regional court system such as Stacy’s may well improve local human rights 
situations, it will not be capable of capturing the entire field.167 
In terms of the regional variation that may be accommodated by Stacy’s 
proposed regional human rights court system, a further possible issue has 
been noted by Heyns and killander.168 They highlight problems in how dif-
ferent regional human rights institutions handle the same rights. The authors 
159. Id. at 5, 32 n.76, 35, 37–75, 170.
160. Id. at 134–38.
161. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 21, at 1175–76, 1202.
162. Stacy, supra note 1, at 173.
163. Id. at 176–77, 179. For example, in a female genital cutting case, a new African Court 
could adapt an approach used by local NGO’s of affirming the underlying culture of 
the practice, while directing a government to set up a program advocating alternative 
rituals for entry into adulthood.
164. Id. at 32, 173 n.76. Stacy applies her proposed system to a number of controversial 
human rights issues in Chapter 6.
165. Burns H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal, 
20 vanD. J. tRanSnt’l l. 585, 621, 637 (1987).
166. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 21, at 1166.
167. Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, supra note 21, at 238.
168. Stacy, supra note 1, at 32.
Vol. 33548 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
note, “The question arises whether global and regional (and sub-regional) 
systems for international human rights monitoring strengthen, or weaken, 
each other . . . Regional systems have the potential to detract from the 
universalist aspirations of the global system by posing different and indeed 
lower standards of protection.”169 Thus, states seeking to retreat from global 
scrutiny could submit to less challenging regional human rights systems, 
subsequently arguing that they should not be subjected to further inter-
national scrutiny. Although those in the international human rights system 
work to avoid the problem of different or lower standards of human rights 
protection by regional human rights institutions, Christof Heyns and Magnus 
killander argue that the proliferation of systems may alter the situation.170 
This, of course, would only be problematic if standards were to drop to 
levels below those consistent with universal cultural pluralism. That being 
said, Stacy’s proposals both contemplate and address this issue.
With regard to Asia, it has been argued that sub-regional systems would 
perform best where groups have common bonds of history and values, such 
as south Asia, the Middle East, and the Far East. Dialogues have occurred 
and continue to take place between civil society and the ASEAN on whether 
to establish a regional human rights system in Asia where one is lacking.171 
However, some parties express concern regarding the inevitable involvement 
of authoritarian regimes, who might not be amenable to any regional body 
deemed to be probing and invasive and whose rulings would relate to the 
domestic conditions of human rights.172 This will be a difficult hurdle to sur-
mount for Stacy’s proposed courts as well.
Likewise, national human rights institutions that are accredited and 
comply with the Paris Principles are similarly situated halfway between 
domestic and international human rights systems.173 They are perceived as 
playing a critical role in the effective implementation and advancement of 
international human rights principles at domestic levels.174 Despite difficulties 
169. Christof Heyns & Magnus killander, Towards Minimum Standards for Regional Human 
Rights Systems, in eSSayS on inteRnational laW in HonoR of W. MicHael ReiSMan (Mahnoush 
H. Arsanjani et al. eds., forthcoming 2011).
170. Id. at 43.
171. See, e.g., Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, available at http://
www.aseanhrmech.org/aboutus.html. 
172. SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 124–25.
173. Andrea Durbach, Human Rights Commissions in Times of Trouble and Transition: The 
Case of the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal, Presentation at Human Rights 
in the Asia Pacific Conference at Univ. of Sydney, Australia, 1–2, 31–32 (15 May 2010), 
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in defending their independence from national governments and civil society, 
there has been much recent development in national human rights institu-
tions’ application of human rights principles in domestic spheres, monitoring 
domestic legislation and handling human rights cases. Their recommenda-
tions and advice to governments and their agencies are frequently based on 
extensive investigations and inspections. However, domestic governments 
may not prioritize them and may even be antagonistic to human rights. This 
situation limits human rights institutions’ effectiveness substantially. Yet, this 
evidences state failure to meet human rights requirements rather than a 
particular problem with national human rights institutions. Thus, state gov-
ernment cooperation may similarly be a difficulty faced by Stacy’s regional 
human rights courts, notwithstanding their having greater independence 
than national human rights institutions.175
Finally, the vast numbers of human rights cases in each region would 
still make such a system difficult to access for many of those involved in 
human rights violations. Some of the earlier literature on regional human 
rights regimes highlights problems such as individuals’ knowledge of their 
human rights and of the existence of mechanisms that promote and protect 
them, expectations that such mechanisms will provide redress, surrounding 
socioeconomic and political situations, and importantly, the availability of 
counsel or NGOs to assist in processing complaints. There is also the issue 
of regional courts’ refusals to hear cases when domestic laws are viewed as 
securing complainants’ rights,176 as domestic litigation mechanisms must be 
meaningfully exhausted.177 However, as noted in the introduction to this essay, 
this exhaustion requirement is frequently not realistic for many in develop-
ing nations. The issues discussed in this essay consequently underscore the 
necessity to further scrutinize the grassroots realities and social contexts of 
legal and lay actors throughout the very diverse global South in order to offer 
additional proposals for change generally, and in particular as they relate to 
domestic lower courts and non-state quasi-legal justice regimes processing 
large numbers of human rights cases throughout the developing world.
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VI. CoNCLUSIoN
Southern Voices and 21st Century provide original attempts to rethink inter-
national human rights theory and practice to match the very diverse local 
realities throughout the globe. They will generate fascinating debates in the 
legal community and will serve as fundamental contributions in the timely 
discussion on the future of international human rights law and practice in 
the twenty-first century. This essay additionally aims to contribute to debates 
within the academy as well as to contemporary policy discussions about the 
disconnect between international human rights discourses and grassroots 
realities for many in the global South. 
While in general agreement with the paradigm shifts and proposals 
described in both reviewed books, this essay argues that these analyses are 
significant, yet they require supplementation. One of the main functions of 
human rights is to give voice to and make visible the suffering and oppressed 
in order to empower them and ameliorate their situations.178 Thus, bottom-
up accounts from local legal and lay actors involved in everyday human 
rights violations cases throughout developing countries that are not captured 
by international organizations or the media must be immersed more fully 
within the dominant human rights debates. It may be that to the extent that 
human rights concepts depend on a social and intellectual vocabulary dif-
ferent from that which a given population has internalized, those concepts 
will be meaningless. Yet, one cannot determine whether this problem exists 
in a given situation conducting local empirical research. Such primary data 
is necessary to elucidate actors’ epistemologies, social contexts, attitudes, 
and other micro-realities when involved in human rights cases. Domestic 
NGO explanations of local situations provided to various UN committees 
are important but, insufficient in adequately providing voice to those at 
grassroots levels. As such, both volumes highlight gaps inherent in much of 
the literature on international human rights, which represents largely top-
down analyses of human rights issues. 
Second, evaluations and recommendations relating to human rights 
practice must include the fact that large numbers of human rights cases are 
regularly processed in quasi-legal non-state justice regimes in the legally 
pluralistic global South and never reach the formal courts. There is a dearth 
of data from local actors’ perspectives on how, if at all, international human 
rights norms are being deployed in case processing in non-state justice sys-
tems as well as in the lower courts of developing states where most cases 
that reach any formal justice systems are processed. Thus, more examples 
of the type of research presented here could make a valuable contribution 
178. SoutHeRn voiceS, supra note 1, at 161, 164, 212.
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to suggestions such as Stacy’s regional courts in terms of designing them 
to maximize both external and internal legitimacy. Further knowledge from 
local legal and lay actors’ perspectives throughout the developing world is 
also necessary, particularly concerning their conceptions and expectations 
of human rights and their perceived needs, objectives, agendas and experi-
ences in various formal courts and quasi-legal justice systems, including 
their views on the interplay between the two.
In depth understanding of these issues can be accomplished through 
participant observations of case hearings as well as interpretive, ethnographic 
accounts from victims, accused, lawyers, family members, and others involved 
in human rights cases. This knowledge must contribute in a substantial way to 
macro-level conversations in all areas of human rights scholarship. Combin-
ing bottom-up legal and lay actors’ perspectives on human rights cases with 
the realities of legal pluralism will enable a more nuanced, contextualized, 
and comprehensive understanding of the permeation and realities of human 
rights on the ground. This knowledge is critical to innovatively engage and 
possibly, reframe the controversies in international human rights theory and 
practice and to assist in effecting realizable change for the subjects of human 
rights in the legally pluralistic global South.
